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Mandatory Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes:
Improving Arbitrability and Enforceability
Through Proper Procedural Choices
S.I. Strong*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary commercial practice often views trusts and their civil law equivalents, typically
referred to as foundations or associations,1 as the functional equivalents of corporations and other
business associations, at least in a number of important regards.2 As a result, many lawyers
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M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author, who is
admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and Wales, is
Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution and Associate Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri. This Article was completed in part while the author was the Henry G. Schermers
Fellow at the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL) and the Netherlands Institute for
Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), and the author gratefully acknowledges
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1

Although trusts developed historically as a common law device, civil law jurisdictions are becoming
increasingly involved in this field, either because they are developing their own domestic forms of trusts
or because they are being asked to recognize trusts formed in common law countries. See Henry
Christensen III, Foreign Trusts and Alternative Vehicles, 1902 PLI/CORP. 323, §4 (Aug. 18-19, 2011);
Adair Dyer, International Recognition and Adoption of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague Convention,
32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 (1999); Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack
of Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America? 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 701, 703-07, 721-51 (2007); Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror, 94
MINN. L. REV. 602, 637-50 (2010); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 437-45 (1998); John H. Langbein,
The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 186 (1997)
[hereinafter Langbein, Commercial Trusts]; John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629, 632-43, 669-71 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian]; Maurizio
Luponi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 967, 970-73 (1999); Julien Perrin, The
Recognition of Trusts and Their Use in Estate Planning Under Continental Laws, 10 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L.
629, 630 (2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation to
Comparativists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 322 (2003). For ease of discussion, the term “trust”
will be used to refer to all of these devices, unless otherwise indicated.
2
See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 1, at 434; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 631; Paul B.
Miller, The Future for Business Trusts: A Comparative Analysis of Canadian and American Uniform
Legislation, 36 QUEEN’S L.J. 443, 452-55, 474-78, 482, 499 (2011); A. Joseph Warburton, Trusts Versus
Corporations: An Empirical Analysis of Competing Organizational Forms, 36 J. CORP. L. 183, 188
(2010).
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consider trust arbitration to be just another variant of commercial arbitration, a belief that is
strengthened by the number of trusts that regularly appear as parties in arbitrations all over the
world.3 Indeed, some of the most highly publicized cases to arise in international commercial
arbitration in recent years have involved trusts.4
Although these matters gained a great deal of notoriety, none of the issues turned on the
fact that one of the parties was a trust. Indeed, the irrelevance of the trust form to the arbitral
proceedings would seem to reinforce the notion that trust-related arbitration is not in any way
special.
Such a conclusion would be deeply misguided. In fact, the reason that these proceedings
did not appear to be significantly different than standard commercial arbitrations is that they did
not really constitute “trust disputes” per se, arising, as they did, out of contractual relationships
between trusts and unrelated third parties, and thus involving matters entirely external to the
trusts themselves. However, external third party disputes are not the only kind of trust-related
controversy to arise, nor indeed are they the most common. Instead, “[m]ost trust disputes are
internal disputes”5 that address matters relating to the inner workings of the trust and involve
conflicts between some or all of the various parties to the trust, including trustees, protectors

3

See The Trustees of the Edmond Stern Settlement v. Levy, [2009] EWHC 14 (TCC), ¶¶1-2; Laughton v.
CGI Tech. & Sol’ns, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 262, 263-64 (D. Mass. 2009); Delaney Elec. Co., Inc. v.
Schiessle, 601 N.E. 2d 978, 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); United States Trust Co., N.A. v. Cavalieri, No.
HHDCV070513653S, 2008 WL 1822721, at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 1, 2008).
4
See Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, ¶¶1-2, 7 (Lord Mance);
Fili Shipping Co. Ltd. Premium Nafta Products Ltd, [2007] UKHL 40 ¶¶3-5 (Lord Hoffman), on appeal
from Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 891.
5
Michael Hwang, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S LEADING EXPERTS IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 83, 83 (2009). Different commentators define internal and external trust
disputes differently. See Paul Buckle & Carey Olsen, Trust Disputes and ADR, 14 TR. & TRUSTEES 649,
651 (2008); Tina Wüstemann, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2007, 33, 38 (Christoph Müller ed., 2007).
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and/or beneficiaries.6 These types of proceedings are much more problematic as a matter of
arbitration law and procedure, and it is these types of disputes that are the subject of this Article.
One of the major difficulties associated with arbitration of internal trust disputes involves
the mechanism by which such matters can be made subject to a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement.7 Thus far, the only plausible means of doing so has been to place an arbitration
provision in the trust itself.8 However, a number of objections have been raised in response to
this practice.9 While matters relating to the jurisprudential propriety of mandatory trust
arbitration have been discussed at length in the legal literature,10 one issue that has been largely

6

See DAVID HAYTON ET AL., UNDERHILL AND HAYTON LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
¶¶8.157-8.167 (18th ed. 2010); Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 664; Wüstemann, supra note 5,
at 36.
7
Pre-dispute agreements in the trust context are preferable to post-dispute agreements for the same
reasons that apply outside the trust realm. However, post-dispute agreements regarding internal trust
concerns are largely uncontroversial in a number of jurisdictions because those statutes have enacted
statutes giving trustees the power to enter into nonjudicial means of dispute resolution. See Trustee Act
1925, §15(f), as amended by Trustee Act 2000, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/15-16/19; Idaho Code Ann. §§15-8-101, 15-8-103 (2011);
Wash. Rev. Code §§11.96A.010, 11.96A.030 (2012); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL), Uniform Trust Code (2000), §§111, 816(23), last revised or amended in 2005,
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uta/2005final.htm [hereinafter UTC].
8
Interestingly, efforts to include arbitration provisions in trusts are somewhat analogous to efforts to
include arbitration provisions in the charter or by-laws of corporations as a means of requiring the
arbitration of internal shareholder disputes. See Christian Borris, Arbitrability of Corporate Law Disputes
in Germany, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 55 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al., eds., 2011); Olivier Caprasse,
Objective Arbitrability of Corporate Disputes – Belgium and France, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR, supra,
at 79; Gerard Meijer & Josefina Guzman, The International Recognition of an Arbitration Clause in the
Articles of Association of a Company, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR, supra, at 117; S.I. Strong, Arbitration
of Trust Law Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. __ (forthcoming
2012) [hereinafter Strong, Two Bodies Collide].
9
For example, some states require an arbitration provision to either be or be contained within a contract,
and a trust may not be considered a contract per se. See Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2011), petition for review filed Sept. 8, 2011; Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612-13 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (2011). But see New South Federal Savings
Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 643 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (noting “[m]utuality of obligations is not
required for a contract to be enforceable under Mississippi law. Accordingly, this court is not persuaded
that the agreement to arbitrate contained in the Deed of Trust is deficient”); see Strong, Two Bodies
Collide, supra note 8.
10
See American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC), Arbitration Task Force Report 34-42
(Sept. 2006), available at http://www.mnbar.org/sections/probatetrust/ACTEC%20Arbitration%20Task%20Force%20Report-2006.pdf; Buckle & Olsen, supra note 5, at
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ignored involves the question of whether arbitration can provide the kind of procedures that are
necessary to the proper resolution of internal trust disputes.
This lack of attention is problematic given that internal trust controversies give rise to a
multitude of procedural challenges that are seldom, if ever, seen in other contexts. For example,
trust disputes not only proceed in rem, such that an award will be binding on “all persons having
adequate notice, whether or not they actually participate in the proceeding,”11 but can also
involve parties who are unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent at the time the dispute
arises.12 Parties to trusts may also require assistance with certain trust-related procedures known
as judicial instruction and accounting that bear little resemblance to “normal” types of
arbitration.13
It is unclear why the arbitral community has not yet considered these issues in any
detail.14 To some extent, it may be that the traditional isolation of trust law has meant that few

655; Lawrence Cohen & Joanna Poole, Trust Arbitration – Is It Desirable and Does it Work? 18 TR. &
TRUSTEES __ (2012); Lawrence Cohen & Marcus Staff, The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 7 J. INT’L TR.
& CORP. PLAN. 203, 210 (1999); David Fox, Non-excludable Trustee Duties, 17 TR. & TRUSTEES 17, 25
(2011); David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. __,
*54 (forthcoming 2012); Charles Lloyd & Jonathan Pratt, Trust in Arbitration, 12 TR. & TRUSTEES 18, 18
(2006); Bridget A. Logstrom, Arbitration in Estate and Trust Disputes: Friend or Foe? 30 AM. COLL.
TR. & ESTATES COUNS. J. 266, 266-68 (2005); Gail E. Mautner & Heidi L.G. Orr, A Brave New World:
Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the Uniform Trust Code and Washington’s and
Idaho’s Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Acts, 35 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 159, 181 (2009);
Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J.
DISP. RES. 627, 630 (2011); E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent
Testator Form Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 275, 277 (1999); Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 8; Tina Wüstemann, Anglo-Saxon Trusts
and (Swiss) Arbitration: Alternative to Trust Litigation? TR. & TRUSTEES __ (2012); Wüstemann, supra
note 5, at 55-56.
11
Blaine Covington Janin, Comment, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55
CAL. L. REV. 521, 529 (1967); see also Horton, supra note 10, at *9; Anna di Robilant, The Virtues of
Common Ownership, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1359, 1360, 1368 (2011).
12
For examples of how these issues might arise in practice, see infra notes 206-08, 211 and
accompanying text.
13
See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 662.
14
Virtually all analysis of trust arbitration has been conducted by experts in trust law and published in
specialty journals for the trust industry.
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specialists in arbitration were experienced enough in trust law to undertake this kind of
analysis.15 Alternatively, it may be because the arbitral community does not believe that existing
arbitral procedures need any amendment. Indeed, that was the conclusion reached several years
ago by a working group formed by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to consider
whether the ICC should adopt any new procedures for use in trust disputes.16 However, the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) has arrived at precisely the opposite conclusion,
creating a dedicated set of rules – the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (AAA Trust
Arbitration Rules) – especially for use in trust disputes.17
This lack of consensus regarding the possible need for special procedures for trust
disputes suggests that an in-depth analysis of trust arbitration is long overdue.18 This Article
therefore aims to fill this gap in the legal literature by identifying the unique attributes of trust
disputes that create difficulties in arbitration; considering whether those difficulties require the
15

See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 626 (2010).
16
See ICC Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes, 19 ICC BULL. 9, Explanatory Notes 4-6 (2008)
[hereinafter ICC Model Trust Clause], available on
http://www.iccdrl.com/CODE/LevelThree.asp?page=Commission%20Reports&tocxml=ltoc_CommRepo
rtsAll.xml&tocxsl=DoubleToc.xsl&contentxml=CR_0035.xml&contentxsl=arbSingle.xsl&L1=Commissi
on%20Reports&L2=&Locator=9&AUTH=&nb=10. The working group decided that it was sufficient to
draft a new model clause. See id.; see also Christopher P. Koch, A Tale of Two Cities! – Arbitrating Trust
Disputes and the ICC’s Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes, 2 Y.B. INT’L ARB. __ (2012); S.I. Strong,
Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the Enforceability of a Mandatory
Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter
Strong, Language].
17
See AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, effective 1 June 2009 [hereinafter AAA Trust Arbitration
Rules], available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_004135&_afrLoop=61313946
326739&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=11ysgf10nw_108#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3D11ysgf10
nw_108%26_afrLoop%3D61313946326739%26doc%3DADRSTG_004135%26_afrWindowMode%3D0
%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D11ysgf10nw_160.
18
Interestingly, although the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules have been in existence since 2003 and are the
only set of procedures targeted specifically toward trust disputes, they are not very well known in either
the trust industry or the arbitral community. Indeed, only a few references have ever been made to the
AAA Trust Arbitration Rules in the legal literature, and then only in passing. See Horton, supra note 10,
at *7; Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the Parameters for Mandatory
Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 118, 130-32 (2011).
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adoption of any special procedural mechanisms; describing what those procedures might entail;
and evaluating the extent to which the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules incorporate any of the
procedural innovations suggested in the course of the discussion.
The discussion proceeds as follows. First, Section II provides a basic introduction to
trusts and outlines the importance of this area of law to commercial lawyers and arbitral
specialists. This discussion is necessary to set later analyses in context.
Next, Section III describes some of the more unique types of disputes arising out of the
inner workings of trusts. While this discussion has the benefit of familiarizing non-specialists
with some of the unique challenges associated with trust law, this section also begins to grapple
with a number of the more salient legal issues by considering the extent to which these various
types of internal trust disputes are arbitrable. This section also introduces the various ways that
states deal with trust arbitration, ranging from explicit and precisely drawn legislation to
statutory silence.
Section IV considers various procedural problems associated with mandatory trust
arbitration and the extent to which those issues can be resolved through adoption of specific
arbitral procedures. The discussion here focuses on three basic concerns – arbitrability,
impermissible ouster of the courts and proper representation of the parties – that seem
particularly sensitive to changes in arbitral procedure.
Next, Section V introduces the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules and analyzes their
effectiveness in light of the procedural issues raised in Section IV. This section also considers a
second set of specialized arbitral rules – the German Institution of Arbitration (Deutsche
Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit or DIS) Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes
(DIS Supplementary Rules) – to see whether any of those procedures would be applicable to

6

trust arbitration.19 Although the DIS Supplementary Rules do not apply to trusts, there are a
number of similarities between arbitration of internal trust disputes and arbitration of internal
shareholder disputes that make the DIS Supplementary Rules relevant to this discussion.
Furthermore, the approach used by the DIS varies significantly from that adopted by the AAA,
which allows for productive comparative analysis.
Finally, Section VI pulls the various strands of discussion together and concludes the
Article with some closing observations. In so doing, the text offers some practical advice to
those involved in drafting procedures in this area of practice.
Before beginning, it is important to describe the parameters of the current analysis. First,
this discussion will not, for the most part, attempt to differentiate between commercial and other
types of trusts. This is not because these distinctions are not important, for they very well may
be.20 Indeed, some jurisdictions treat business trusts as more akin to corporations than to trusts,
at least in certain contexts,21 and it may be that commercial trusts could or should be considered
more amenable to mandatory trust arbitration than other kinds of trusts.22 However, scholarly
and judicial analysis has not yet begun to distinguish between the two devices, and proper
consideration of this matter would be beyond the scope of the current Article. Therefore, these
distinctions are for the most part excluded, although some relevant observations are made from
time to time.
19

See DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes, effective 15 September 2009, available at
http://www.dis-arb.de/download/DIS_SRCoLD_%202009_Download.pdf [hereinafter DIS
Supplementary Rules].
20
See Fox, supra note 10, at 26; Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries With Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1867, 1870, 1877-78 (2010). But see Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the Express
Trust, 36 ALBERTA L. REV. 630, 630-31 (1998).
21
See Christensen, supra note 1, §2 (noting that in the U.S., “[b]usiness trusts, although trusts for
property law purposes, are taxed as corporations because they conduct a business”); see also HAYTON ET
AL., supra note 6, ¶1.133 (noting that beneficiaries of commercial trusts in England may be treated
differently than beneficiaries of private family trusts).
22
See Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 8.
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Second, trusts operate in an increasingly globalized context, requiring this Article to
adopt a similarly international and comparative approach to the issues presented herein.
Particular emphasis is placed on English and U.S. law as they relate to both trusts and arbitration.
However, this Article is not intended to present a comprehensive comparative analysis of the two
jurisdictions. Instead, the aim is simply to use the two legal systems as exemplars of the various
issues that can arise in this area of law.23 Thus, legal developments from several other countries
will also be discussed as appropriate.
Having laid the foundation for further discussion, the analysis begins with an introduction
to the various types of trusts used today.

II.

WHAT IS A TRUST?

Trusts plays a large and growing role in the international economy, making trust arbitration a
matter of increasing relevance to commercial practitioners. Not only do trust vehicles hold
trillions of dollars worth of assets and generate billions of dollars worth of annual income, but
administrators and trustees earn similarly massive amounts in fees each year.24 Indeed, the vast
majority of trusts operating today are commercial rather than personal in nature, putting to rest
the notion that trusts are primarily used as “mere” estate planning devices.25 Furthermore, trusts

23

These two countries have been chosen for several reasons. First, England and the United States are
leaders in both trust and arbitration law. As such, the principles developed in these two nations have
persuasive effect elsewhere in the world. Second, much of the most probing scholarly analysis of
mandatory trust arbitration comes from England, although some of the best judicial discussions of
mandatory trust arbitration come from the United States. Since lessons can be learned from both sources,
both are included. Finally, the author is qualified as a solicitor in England as well as an attorney in the
United States and has first-hand practical experience in both jurisdictions.
24
See Horton, supra note 10, at *22 (noting irrevocable trusts in the United States “generated $188 billion
in income and $4.7 billion in trustees’ fees” in 2008 alone); Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1,
at 177-78 (estimating in 1997 that commercial trusts held assets in the range of $11.6 trillion, with noncommercial trusts holding an additional $672 billion in assets, conservatively estimated).
25
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166.
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can no longer be considered purely domestic mechanisms, since favorable tax laws in various
off-shore jurisdictions are making international trusts increasingly attractive and popular.26
As the use of trusts has grown, so, too, has the amount of hostile trust litigation
proceeding around the world, so much so that such suits are said to be reaching “near epidemic”
levels.27 Unsurprisingly, this level of litigation has led many settlors and trustees28 to express an
interest in arbitration as a means of limiting extensive litigation costs.29
However, arbitration of internal trust disputes is not as simple as arbitration of other sorts
of commercial matters, since trust law retains a variety of substantive and procedural
characteristics not seen in other areas of law.30 Notably, many arbitration or commercial
practitioners may not even be aware of these special attributes, since most lawyers’ only
exposure to trusts was in law school (and then solely in the context of testamentary or estate
planning),31 if they even studied it at all.32 Given this likely lack of familiarity with trusts, it is

26

See Wüstemann, supra note 5, at 33-34.
Cohen & Staff, supra note 10, at 203; see also Georg von Segesser, Arbitrability in Estate and Trust
Litigation, in PAPERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF ESTATE AND TRUST LAW – 2000 21, 21
(Rosalind F. Atherton ed. 2001); Wüstemann, supra note 5, at 33-34.
28
Many settlors and trustees are often sophisticated commercial actors in their own right, since numerous
trusts rely on professional trustees drawn from the ranks of national and international financial
institutions. See Wüstemann, supra note 5, at 41.
29
See id.; see also Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A
Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable? 42 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 352-53 (2007); Horton, supra note 10, at *3; Katzen, supra note 18, at 118-19;
Janin, supra note 11, at 521.
30
This is due in part to the historic allocation of trust-related matters to special probate or chancery
courts, a distinction which continues in some jurisdictions to this day. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note
15, at 626.
31
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 165.
32
Most civil law lawyers never had the opportunity to study trusts, since trusts developed as creatures of
the common law and are still primarily associated with that legal tradition. See supra note 1.
27
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useful to provide a very brief introduction to the device so as to lay a foundation for discussions
regarding arbitration of these unique legal mechanisms.33

(a)

What is a Trust

The device now known as a trust originally developed in medieval England as a means of
safeguarding and transferring wealth.34 Although trusts have changed greatly over the years in
both their uses and forms, some factors have remained constant, including the elements
necessary to establish a trust.35
Precise requirements associated with establishing a trust vary according to national law.
However, one internationally recognized set of criteria can be found in the Hague Convention on
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition (Hague Convention on Trusts), which
states that:
the term “trust” refers to the legal relationships created – inter vivos or on death –
by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the control of a
trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose.
A trust has the following characteristics –
a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee’s
own estate;
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of
another person on behalf of the trustee;
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is
accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance

33

More detailed reading on trusts and their civil law equivalents exists elsewhere. See HAYTON ET AL.,
supra note 6 (discussing English trusts); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15 (discussing U.S. trusts);
Christensen et al., supra note 1 (discussing civil law equivalents of trusts).
34
See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 632-43, 669-71.
35
See id.; see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶1.95; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 369 (noting
that “[t]he word ‘trust’ is used for many property arrangements which have little in common with each
other apart from the fact that they were historically enforced in . . . the court of Equity”).
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with the terms of the trust and the special duties imposed upon him by
law.
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the
trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent
with the existence of a trust.36
Thus, the three most important persons in a trust relationship are the settlor (also called
the donor), who creates and funds the trust; the trustee, who holds legal title to the property,
though only for the benefit of the beneficiary; and the beneficiary, who holds equitable title to
the property and receive the benefits of the trust.37 There may be more than one person in each
role (for example, there may be multiple settlors, multiple trustees and/or multiple beneficiaries),
and in some cases, the same person may act in multiple roles (for example, a settlor may also be
a trustee, and a trustee may also be a beneficiary). The variety of potential parties means that
most internal trust disputes can or will involve more than two participants, which has led some
trust law practitioners to question whether arbitration is capable of handling the special
procedural challenges that are sure to arise in this area of law.38
Historically, trusts were typically established to protect property from creditors, a use
which continues to this day.39 Trusts were also created as a means of ensuring competent
administration of funds in cases where the beneficiary might be incapable of acting on his or her
36

See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, art. 2, 1 July 1985, 23
I.L.M. 1389 (1984) [hereinafter Hague Convention on Trusts]; see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6,
¶8.1; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 374-81; Perrin, supra note 1, at 634-36.
37
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 370; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 632. Some
trusts also provide for “protectors” (also known as “enforcers”), though typically only in situations where
the settlor wishes to establish an extra layer of protection regarding the administration of the trust. See
HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶8.157-8.167; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 664; Wüstemann,
supra note 5, at 36.
38
See Horton, supra note 10, at *9; Janin, supra note 11, at 529; Wüstemann, supra note 5, at 53-54.
39
See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 640-43. However, creditors of the settlor may be able to
reach trust funds if the settlor has attempted to use the trust form to defraud creditors or cheat a spouse or
child of a statutory share at death. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶7.1(2), 8.252-8.53; MCGOVERN
ET AL., supra note 15, at 413-14, 656. Creditors of beneficiaries stand in a slightly different position, with
many trusts being drafted in such a way that the trust assets cannot be reached. See id. at 417-20.
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own behalf (as in cases involving a legal impediment, such as minority) or might lack the
necessary qualities to act prudently (as in cases involving persons who were financially
unsophisticated or had a tendency toward profligacy).40

(b)

Types of Trusts

Trusts exist in a wide variety of forms. All express trusts can be categorized as (1) either a living
trust (also known as an inter vivos trust) or a testamentary trust, and (2) either a revocable trust
or an irrevocable trust.41 Beyond that, trusts are typically defined by their purpose. Many trusts
(such as dynasty trusts, marital trusts or family trusts) are meant to pass on wealth within a
family, with the quintessential example being a trust created by a parent to benefit a child either
before or after the parent’s death.42 However, trusts serve other purposes as well. For example,
some trusts are created entirely for charitable purposes43 while others, such as asset protection
trusts or credit shelter trusts, appear to focus primarily on deterring potential creditors from
reaching trust assets or garnering various tax savings.44 Although most trusts are created
intentionally (“express trusts”), trusts may also be created by statute or by operation of law.45
Although family planning trusts are perhaps the most well-known type of trust in
existence today, they are not the most common. Instead, “well over 90% of the money held in
40

See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶11.1, 11.77-11.78; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 389, 41720.
41
A living or inter vivos trust comes into effect during the lifetime of the settlor, whereas a testamentary
trust comes into effect only after the death of the settlor. Revocable trusts may be changed or terminated
by the settlor, whereas irrevocable trusts may not. Thus, only living trusts may be revocable.
42
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 369-70; Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 165.
43
Charitable trusts are often subject to slightly different rules than private trusts. See MCGOVERN ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 436-50.
44
See id. at 369-70.
45
Trusts created as a matter of law include resulting trusts, constructive trusts and trusts created through
bankruptcy. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶3.1-3.11; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 369-70.
These trusts are not amenable to arbitration for various reasons and therefore are not discussed in the
current Article.
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trust in the United States” in recent years has been held “in commercial trusts as opposed to
personal trusts.”46 Commercial trusts are not limited to the United States, but have become
increasingly popular in other jurisdictions as well.47 Indeed, numerous commentators have noted
that “the role of trusts in intrafamily wealth transfers is today ‘relatively trivial,’” particularly
when compared to the “enormously important” role of trusts in the business context.48
A commercial trust (also known as a business trust) can be defined as “a trust that
implements bargained-for exchange, in contrast to a donative transfer,”49 which would be the
primary motivation for a trust created to pass on family wealth. Some, but not all, commercial or
business trusts are created by statute.50
Commercial trusts are created for a variety of reasons. Some of these rationales are
largely similar to those involving trusts in other contexts and thus suggest that commercial and
non-commercial trusts should be treated similarly in most, if not all, regards. For example, both
business and non-business trusts provide protection from insolvency and some forms of taxation
while also creating a fiduciary regime that requires the application of fiduciary duties such as
loyalty and prudence.51

46

Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166-67, 178 (citing figures from mid- to late-1990s).
See id. at 166; see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶1.97-1.138; Figueroa, supra note 1, at 740-51;
Flannigan, supra note 20, at 630-31; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 1, at 434; Langbein, Contractarian,
supra note 1, at 630-31.
48
Christensen, supra note 1, §1 (quoting Hansmann and Mattei).
49
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166-67; see HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶1.1001.138.
50
See NCCUSL, Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act, Prefatory Note, approved July 9-16, 2009
[hereinafter Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act], available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ubta/2009final.htm; see also Robert J. D’Agostino, The
Business Trust and Bankruptcy Remoteness, 2011 ANN. SURVEY OF BANKR. L. 4 (2011).
51
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 179-83, 189.
47
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However, business trusts also have purposes that are entirely unique to the commercial
realm.52 For example, parties to commercial trusts often take advantage of the structural
flexibility inherent in trusts and create relationships or procedures that might be difficult or
impossible to achieve as a matter of corporate law, particularly with respect to “matters of
internal governance and . . . the creation of beneficial interests.”53 “Transaction planners
designing asset securitization trusts especially welcome the freedom to carve beneficial interests
without regard to traditional classes of corporate shares,” creating a wide range of “so-called
tranches, each embodied in its own class of trust security.”54
Interest in commercial trusts has grown exponentially in recent years due to the increased
liberalization of laws regarding the use and creation of such devices as a matter of national and
international law. 55 However, commercial trusts “are a woefully under-analyzed and
underappreciated form of business organization,” despite their being “critically important” to
52

For this reason, some authorities exclude commercial trusts from standard trust law analyses. For
example, the U.S. Restatement of Trusts excludes business trusts from consideration and focuses solely on
trusts as donative devices. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §1 cmt. B (stating that “[a]lthough many
of the rules applicable to trusts are applied to business trusts, yet many of the rules are not applied . . . The
business trust is a special kind of business association and can best be dealt with in connection with other
business associations”); see also David M. English, Representing Trust and Estate Beneficiaries and
Fiduciaries: The Uniform Trust Code, SK089 ALI-ABA 191 IV (Feb. 10-11, 2005) (noting the Uniform
Trust Code is not directed at commercial trusts but does not exclude them from consideration, either).
However, “[n]either the text of the Restatement’s official comment, nor the reporter’s note, supplies any
authority for [the Restatement’s] claim that ‘many of the rules’ of trust law do not apply to business uses
of the trust.” Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166 n.6. Furthermore, courts often do not
distinguish between the two. Indeed, no known judicial opinions or statutes dealing with mandatory trust
arbitration differentiate between personal and commercial trusts. Therefore, this Article will not attempt
to distinguish between the two types of trusts.
53
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 183; see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶1.99;
Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 659-63.
54
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 183 (citation omitted). “A tranche is simply a slice of a
deal, a payment stream whose expected return increases with its riskiness.” Id. at 183 n.109.
55
See Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act, supra note 50; Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration
Clauses in Trusts: The U.S. Developments and a Comparative Perspective, 3 REVISTA PARA EL
ANALISIS DEL DERECHO (INDRET) 1, 20 (2008), available at http://www.indret.com/pdf/559_en.pdf;
David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000), SL003 ALI-ABA 1 (July 21-22, 2005); Figueroa,
supra note 1, at 721-39; Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 187-88; Robert H. Sitkoff & Max
M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities
and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359-64 (2005).
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various capital markets.56 Indeed, many lawyers may be unaware of what constitutes a
commercial trust per se. As such, it is useful to summarize some of the more common types of
business trusts so as to be better able to consider the types of procedures that might be
appropriate in arbitrations involving such devices. Notably, a number of commercial trusts have
already resolved certain internal disputes pursuant to an arbitration provision found in the trust
itself.57
Several basic types of trusts are routinely used in commercial practice, although the
precise shape of these devices varies according to national law.58 Indeed, new forms of trusts are
being developed for use in business settings all the time.59 The following discussion does not
attempt to identify all of these types of trusts, but simply provides an introduction to some of the
various forms currently used in commercial practice.
The first and perhaps most important is the pension trust, which is a major commercial
device in the United States and elsewhere.60 These plans hold trillions of dollars worth of assets
in the United States,61 with similarly significant amounts held in trust in other nations. Pension

56

Miller, supra note 2, at 444.
See Municipality of San Juan v. Corporacion Para El Fomento Economico de la Ciudad Capital, 597 F.
Supp. 2d 247, 248-49 (D. Puerto Rico 2008) (enforcing a mandatory arbitration provision involving the
rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)); Robin v. Doran, No. 392456, 2010 WL
728558, at *1 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 3, 2010) (involving mandatory arbitration provision in by-laws of a
condominium trust).
58
See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶1.135, 1.138; Miller, supra note 2, at 447. For list of the various
types of trusts recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, see Christensen, supra note 1, §2 (listing
nineteen separate categories of trust).
59
For example, New Zealand has recently developed the “trading trust,” which is distinguishable from
unit or investment trusts. See Law Commission (New Zealand), Court Jurisdiction, Trading Trusts and
Other Issues: Review of the Law of Trusts: Fifth Issues Paper, ¶¶6.1 to 6.5 (2011), available at
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/review-law-trusts?quicktabs_23=issues_paper.
60
See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶1.127; Bosques-Hernández, supra note 55, at 20; Langbein,
Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 168-69.
61
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 168-69 (noting in 1997 that private pension plans
held assets in the realm of $3 trillion, with state and federal plans for governmental employees holding an
addition $1.6 trillion in assets, primarily in trust form). While recent market vicissitudes have changed
the amount held in private and public pension plans since the late 1990s, the amount in question is
57
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trusts arise out of contracts of employment and provide employees with the ability to defer some
of their compensation until retirement.62 Although such trusts include a private contribution
element, the trusts themselves often reflect a statutory element. For example, in the United
States, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) indicates that “all assets of an
employee benefit plan shall be held in trust.”63 The United Kingdom recognizes a related type of
statutory trust known as the employee trust, which is not tied to retirement but which instead
provides certain tax-related and other benefits to current employees.64 Notably, there is evidence
that internal disputes arising out of statutorily-created trusts in ERISA and related contexts have
been made subject to arbitration, at least to a limited degree.65
Another kind of commercial trust is the investment or unit trust.66 These types of
devices, which are often international in nature,67 also hold a staggering amount of assets.68

nevertheless vast. See Employee Benefit Research Institute, 30 Notes 1, 2 (April 2009), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_04-Apr09.PblcPnsPlns1.pdf.
62
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 169. Although life insurance company separate
accounts do not constitute pension trusts per se, they reflect certain similarities in form. See id. at 168
(noting a further $900 billion held in these accounts in 1997).
63
29 U.S.C. §§1103 (2010).
64
See Pensions Act 1995, §124, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/26/contents/enacted; HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶¶1.134,
43.1(1).
65
See Hastings v. Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2008); Bortrager v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087,1092 n.1 (8th Cir. 2005); Contract Serv. Emp’ee Trust v.
Davis, 55 F.3d 533, 535 (10th Cir. 1995); Reeves v. Tarvizian, 351 F.2d 889, 890-92 (1st Cir. 1965).
Arbitration of disputes in this context are subject to special rules published by the AAA and the
International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans (IFEBP). See AAA/IFEBP Multiemployer Pension
Plan Arbitration Rules for Withdrawal Liability, effective 1 Sept. 1986, available at
http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22108; AAA/IFEBP Impartial Umpire Rules for
Arbitration of Impasses Between Trustees of Joint Employee Benefit Trust Funds, effective 1 Jan. 1988,
available at http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22111; Teamsters-Employers Local
945 Pension Fund v. Waste Management of New Jersey, Inc., No. 11-902 (FSH), 2011 WL 2173854, at
*2 (D.N.J. 2 June 2011); I.L.G.W.U. Nat’l Retirement Fund v. Meredith Gray, Inc., 94 Fed. Appx. 850,
852 (2d Cir. 2003). The AAA/IFEBP rules do not appear to address the types of internal disputes under
discussion in this Article and therefore will not be discussed herein.
66
The term “investment trust” is more common in the United States, with the term “unit trust” being used
in England. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶1.122; Bosques-Hernández, supra note 55, at 20;
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 170.
67
See Bosques-Hernández, supra note 5, at 20.
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Investment or unit trusts fall into several subcategories: mutual funds (known as collective
investment schemes in England),69 real estate investment trusts (REITs),70 oil and gas royalty
trusts71 and asset securitization trusts.72 Interestingly, at least one U.S. court has considered
mandatory arbitration in the context of an internal trust dispute involving an investment trust.73
Another U.S. court has discussed an important related issue, namely whether certain internal
disputes arising out of an investment or unit trust can be arbitrated pursuant to a mandatory
arbitration provision found in an insurance policy covering the trust, and has held that arbitration
in such circumstances is permissible.74

68

While comprehensive worldwide figures are impossible to compile, it is perhaps sufficient to note that
in 1997, U.S.-based REITs held over $98 billion in assets. See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note
1, at 171.
69
See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶1.122. Mutual funds can take the form of an investment company
or a trust, with slightly more than half of contemporary mutual funds taking the form of a trust. See
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 170-71.
70
REITs are mutual funds that invest in real property and/or in mortgages on real property. See
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 171. Interestingly, calls have been made to reduce, rather
than increase, the regulation of REITs in the wake of the recent financial crisis, thus showing the level of
legislative support for these types of investment vehicles. See Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 585, 589 (2009).
71
These types of trusts are often created by oil corporations that want a vehicle to hold legal title to
certain oil-producing properties while dispensing beneficial assets to corporate shareholders. See
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 171. The trust interests can be sold, and several of the
larger oil-royalty trusts are publicly traded. See id. at 171-72. Trusts relating to royalties from
intellectual property are also possible. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶1.135.
72
In this form of trust, banks or other financial entities, often called originators or packagers, buy a type
of debt (such as credit card receivables), “but then transfer[ ] [the debt] in trust to a separate trustee.
Shares in that trust are sold to various participating investors, who, under the new scheme, are not lenders
to the bank but share owners in the trust.” Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 172. Changes
have been made to the specific rules regarding these types of investment vehicles in the wake of the
recent financial crisis, but the concept remains viable. See Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Divergences and
Convergences of Common Law and Civil Law Traditions on Asset Partitioning: A Functional Analysis,
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 517, 527-54 (2010); Peter A. Furci, U.S. Trade or Business Implications of
Distressed-Debt Investing, 63 TAX LAW. 527, 537 (2010) (discussing U.S. regulations under the nowrepealed Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT)); Grace Soyon Lee, What’s in a Name?
The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of Credit Card Securitization, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 110, 126 n.82
(2010) (noting FASITs were repealed in 2004 but recognizing the continued use of similar devices).
73
See Stender v. Cardwell, Civ. No. 07-cv-02503-REB-MJW, 2009 WL 3416904, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct.
20, 2009) (involving breach of contract of an UPREIT, which is a type of REIT).
74
See Radian Ins., Inc. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 638 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446-47 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (involving mortgage trusts in the asset securitization context).
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A third kind of commercial trust involves trusts relating to the issuance of bonds. In the
United States, such trusts arise under the Trust Indenture Act,75 which requires “most debt
securities issued in the United States . . . to provide for the services of a corporate fiduciary to act
as trustee for the bondholders or other obligees.”76 Trusts created under the Trust Indenture Act
reflect certain unusual qualities. For example, trustees under bond indentures have fewer
responsibilities for the trust property and typically do not enjoy possession or the right to
possession until a default occurs.77 Instead:
[t]he trustee under a bond indenture acts primarily under the terms of the contract
creating the relationship, and acquires actual possession of the particular assets
only in the event that the issuer breaches the covenants of the loan agreement.
The indenture regime imposes, therefore, a species of contingent or standby
trusteeship.
What commends the trust form for these corporate and municipal bond
transactions is the ability to have a sophisticated financial intermediary – that is, a
trust company – act on behalf of numerous and dispersed bondholders in the event
that a loan transaction does not work out routinely. The indenture trustee
overcomes the coordination problem that inheres in widespread public ownership
of debt securities.78
Other countries also recognize the concept of a bond-related trusts, whereby a trust deed gives a
trustee both the responsibility and the authority to enforce the terms of the bonds held in the

75

See 15 U.S.C. §77aaa (2011).
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 173 (estimating that as of 1997, the amount held
exceeded $3 trillion).
77
See id. at 173-74.
78
Id. at 174 (citations omitted). A related type of device involves a trust created to establish a contingent
value right (CVR) which requires an acquiring party “to pay additional consideration to a Target
company’s stockholders following the close of the acquisition contingent on the occurrence of specified
payment triggers.” Barbara L. Borden & Henry Gosebruch, Contingent Value Rights Outline, 1902
PLI/CORP. 323, 325 (Sept. 22-23, 2011); see also id. at 340 (noting CVRs can be “issued pursuant to a
trust agreement”).
76
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trust.79 Notably, at least one English court has held that claims relating to certain bonds may be
subject to arbitration under an arbitration provision contained in the trust deed.80
A fourth type of commercial trust involves what could be called “the ‘regulatory
compliance trust,’ [which is] a trust created primarily for the purpose of discharging
responsibilities imposed by law.”81 These trusts reflect a variety of forms, including nuclear
decommissioning trusts, environmental remediation trusts, liquidating trusts, prepaid funeral
trusts, foreign insurers trusts and law office trust accounts.82 While no cases have been
discovered that specifically discuss mandatory arbitration in any of these contexts, it is easy to
see how arbitration could be used to resolve issues relating to regulatory compliance trusts.
While there are numerous other types of business trusts in existence, it is unnecessary
outline them all, since the question for this Article is whether existing arbitral procedures
adequately protect the rights of parties involved in arbitration of internal disputes arising under
these and other types of trusts. To answer that question, it is necessary to consider what
constitutes an internal trust dispute and whether such controversies are even arbitrable.83 These
matters are considered in the next section.

III.

TYPES OF TRUST DISPUTES AND ARBITRABILITY OF THOSE DISPUTES

79

See The Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Elektrim S.A. [2009] EWHC 1801 ¶¶1, 11, 16, 18, 37 (Ch).
See The Law Debenture Trust Corp. plc v. Elektrim Fin. B.V. [2005] EWHC 1412, ¶¶38-47 (Ch)
(concluding that the language in the arbitration clause in question provided one party with a unilateral
right to choose to litigate instead of arbitrate, but upholding the provision as binding between the parties).
81
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 174.
82
See id. at 175-76.
83
This Article uses the terms “arbitrable” and “arbitrability” in their international sense to describe which
disputes can be heard in arbitration and which are reserved to the exclusive purview of the courts. See
Stefan Michael Kröll, The “Arbitrability” of Disputes Arising From Commercial Representation, in
ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 317, ¶16-7 (Loukas A. Mistelis &
Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009).
80
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Because trust law and commercial law operate largely in isolation from one another,84 specialists
in arbitration may be unaware of some of the more unique types of controversies that can
develop under a trust as well as the various jurisprudential problems that can arise when settlors
attempt to mandate arbitration of those disputes through an arbitration provision in a trust. While
a comprehensive analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article,85 it is nevertheless
necessary to introduce briefly certain fundamental principles.
When considering arbitration of internal trust disputes, it is useful to distinguish between:
(1) states with legislation explicitly permitting arbitration of trust disputes through inclusion of a
provision in the trust itself; (2) states with legislation explicitly permitting arbitration of trust
disputes but without reference to provisions found in the trust itself; and (3) states without
legislation concerning trust arbitration. Each is discussed separately below.

(a)

States With Legislation Explicitly Permitting Arbitration Through
Inclusion of a Provision in the Trust Itself

Analysis regarding the arbitrability of internal trust disputes is easiest in jurisdictions that
statutorily recognize the validity of an arbitration provision found in a trust, since the legislation
specifically states which types of issues may be made subject to mandatory arbitration. Thus, for
example, the U.S. state of Arizona passed a law in 2008 indicating that “[a] trust instrument may
provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to resolve issues between the trustee
and interested persons or among interested persons with regard to the administration or
distribution of the trust.”86 This provision is to be construed broadly to include “any matter

84

See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 626.
These issues are considered at length elsewhere. See supra note 10.
86
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-10205 (2011).
85

20

involving the trust’s administration, including a request for instructions and an action to declare
rights.”87
The U.S. state of Florida has also made statutory provision for mandatory trust
arbitration, albeit in a smaller range of disputes. That enactment, passed in 2007, indicates that:
(1) A provision in a will or trust requiring the arbitration of disputes, other
than disputes of the validity of all or a part of a will or trust, between or
among the beneficiaries and a fiduciary under the will or trust, or any
combination of such persons or entities, is enforceable.
(2) Unless otherwise specified in the will or trust, a will or trust provision
requiring arbitration shall be presumed to require binding arbitration under s.
44.104.88
While the Florida statute includes a carve-out for challenges to the trust itself,89 the range
of arbitrable matters nevertheless appears relatively broad. However, the precise scope of this
legislation is somewhat unclear, since no cases have yet been decided under this provision.
Legislation concerning mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes also exists outside
the United States. For example, Guernsey, one of the leading jurisdictions for offshore trusts,
enacted a statute in 2007 discussing the availability of various alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, including arbitration.90 That law states that:
(1)

Where -

87

See Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011)
(emphasis omitted).
88
Fla. Stat. Ann. §731.401 (2011); see also Fla. Stat. Ann. §44.104.
89
Challenges to the trust often involve claims based on undue influence, lack of capacity, fraud, duress,
forgery or mistake. Some states bar such disputes from arbitration altogether while other jurisdictions
analyze the issue under standard principles of separability. See Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th
Cir. 2003); Regions Bank v. Britt, No. 4:09CV61TSL-LRA, 2009 WL 3766490, at *2 n. 2 (S.D. Miss.
Nov. 10, 2009); Weizmann Institute of Science v. Neschis, 421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 680 n.28 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 8.
90
The Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, §63, available at http://www.guernseylegalresources.gg/ccm/legalresources/laws/trusts/the-trusts-guernsey-law-2007.en; see also Bosques-Hernández, supra note 55, at 25;
Buckle & Olsen, supra note 5, at 652-55; Andrew Vergunst & Lawrence Grabau, Arbitrating Trust
Disputes, STEP J. (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.stepjournal.org/journal_archive/2011/step_journal_jan_2011/arbitrating_trust_disputes.aspx.

21

(a) the terms of a trust direct or authorise, or the Court so orders, that
any claim against a trustee founded on breach of trust may be referred to
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”),
(b) such a claim arises and, in accordance with the terms of the trust or
the Court’s order, is referred to ADR, and
(c) the ADR results in a settlement of the claim which is recorded in a
document signed by or on behalf of all parties,
the settlement is binding on all beneficiaries of the trust, whether or not
yet ascertained or in existence, and whether or not minors or persons
under legal disability.
(2)

Subsection (1) applies in respect of a beneficiary only if (a) he was represented in the ADR proceedings (whether personally, or
by his guardian, or as the member of a class, or otherwise), or
(b) if not so represented, he had notice of the ADR proceedings and a
reasonable opportunity of being heard,
and only if, in the case of a beneficiary who is not yet ascertained or in
existence, or who is a minor or person under legal disability, the person
conducting the ADR proceedings certifies that he was independently
represented by a person appointed for the purpose by a court of law.
“Notice” in paragraph (b) means 14 days’ notice or such other period as
the person conducting the ADR proceedings may direct.

(3) A person who represents a beneficiary in the ADR proceedings for the
purposes of subsection (2)(a) is under a duty of care to the beneficiary.
(4)
For the avoidance of doubt, the ADR proceedings need not be conducted
in Guernsey or in accordance with the procedural law of Guernsey.
(5)

In this section “ADR” includes conciliation, mediation, early neutral
evaluation, adjudication, expert determination and arbitration, and
“proceedings” includes oral and written proceedings.91

91

The Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, supra note 90, §63.
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Although the statute relates only to a limited range of claims (i.e., claims brought against
a trustee for breach of trust), it specifically contemplates the possibility that arbitration can be
mandated through a provision included in the trust instrument itself. The statute also expressly
indicates that beneficiaries of the trust may be bound by the outcome of the arbitration.
Most recent developments concerning mandatory trust arbitration involve common law
jurisdictions, since those states are home to the classic form of the trust. Indeed, a number of
common law countries other than the U.S. and Guernsey are currently contemplating legislation
in this area of law.92 However, civil law jurisdictions also appear to permit arbitration of trusts
or trust-like devices pursuant to legislation. Thus, for example:
Austrian arbitration law recognizes . . . ways of granting arbitrators the authority
to decide a dispute by arbitration. Section 581(2) ZPO [Zivilprozeßordung or
Code of Civil Procedure] grants such an authority to arbitral tribunals that are set
up in a manner permitted by law, either by testamentary disposition or by other
legal transactions that are not based on the agreement of the parties. Authority is
also granted to tribunals provided for by articles of incorporation.93
The concept of arbitration based on “testamentary disposition or by other legal
transactions that are not based on the agreement of the parties” would appear to permit
arbitration arising out of a trust.94 German law appears to take a similar approach, in that:
[Section] 1066 ZPO [Zivilprozeßordung or Code of Civil Procedure] requires
arbitral tribunals to be legitimized by a testamentary disposition or other noncontractual dispositions. Thus, [Section] 1066 ZPO encompasses situations in
92

For example, both the Bahamas and New Zealand have undertaken efforts in this area of law. See
Trustee (Amendment) Bill 2011, §18, available at
http://www.bacobahamas.com/PDF/Trustee%20(Amendment)%20Bill%202011%20%2015%20April%202011.pdf; Law Commission (New Zealand), supra note 59, ¶¶5.16 to 5.20; Neil
Hartnell, Trustee Act’s Reform “Bold, Innovative,” TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.tribune242.com/business/10252011_Trusts_business_Page1-2.
93
Franz T. Schwartz & Christian W. Konrad, Austria, in THE VIENNA RULES: A COMMENTARY ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRIA 1, 19-20 (Franz T. Schwartz & Christian W. Konrad eds.,
2009) (citations omitted).
94
See Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 8. The reference to arbitration arising out of articles of
incorporation also supports the notion of mandatory trust arbitration, since the two procedures arise in
similar manners.
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which an arbitration clause has a binding effect on an individual who is not a
signatory of an arbitration agreement and did not agree to a contractual arbitration
agreement.95
Furthermore, it has been said that “arbitration clauses in the statute of a
foundation [“stiftung”] in Liechtenstein are . . . binding for persons or entities claiming to
be beneficiaries of the foundation on the basis of its by-laws, although they have not
signed the Charter of the foundation or the arbitration clause contained therein.”96
Although these authorities focus more on the enforceability of an arbitration provision
found in a trust than the arbitrability of certain trust-related claims per se, the implicit
sense is that at least some internal trust concerns will be arbitrable under these provisions.

(b)

States With Legislation Explicitly Permitting Arbitration of Trust Disputes
But Without Reference to Provisions Found in the Trust Itself

Legislation specifically contemplating an arbitration provision in a trust is relatively rare,
particularly in the common law countries where trusts are used most often. However, a number
of jurisdictions provide for trust arbitration without making reference to arbitral provisions found
in the trust itself. This second type of legislation has been in existence in some states for
decades.97
The precise language used varies somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, although
one of the more widely adopted approaches is found in the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), a model
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enactment that has been adopted in whole or in part by twenty-four individual U.S. states.98
Section 111 of the UTC indicates that “interested persons may enter into a binding nonjudicial
settlement agreement with respect to any matter involving a trust,”99 so long as they do “not
violate a material purpose of the trust and include[ ] terms and conditions that could be properly
approved by the court under this [Code] or other applicable law.”100 The scope of arbitrable
matters is quite broad, including, among other things:
(1) the interpretation or construction of the terms of the trust;
(2) the approval of a trustee’s report or accounting;
(3) direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a particular act or the grant to
a trustee of any necessary or desirable power;
(4) the resignation or appointment of a trustee and the determination of a trustee’s
compensation;
(5) transfer of a trust’s principal place of administration; and
(6) liability of a trustee for an action relating to the trust.101
A number of these items relate to internal matters of trust construction and administration
and thus expand the concept of arbitrability beyond mere contract concerns to key issues of
substantive trust law. This is very helpful, since it removes some of the stigma of arbitration by
recognizing that arbitrators are capable of resolving complex trust-related controversies.102
As useful as this provision is, it nevertheless fails in one important regard, namely in
describing the manner in which trust arbitration can be invoked. Indeed, the drafters of the UTC
were purposefully vague when it came to identifying who could enter into these sort of
98
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nonjudicial agreements.103 As a result, the UTC provides no guidance as to whether the settlor
can require nonjudicial resolution of disputes arising under the trust through inclusion of an
arbitration provision in the trust or whether it is only the trustee who has the power to enter into
arbitration agreements at some point after the trust has been created.104 To some extent, the latter
approach would seem to be somewhat in tension with the UTC’s broad approach to arbitrability,
since internal trust concerns are most effectively addressed through an arbitration provision in
the trust itself rather than a post-dispute agreement concluded by the trustee.105
Although the UTC constitutes a significant step forward with regard to the arbitrability of
internal trust disputes, some individual U.S. state statutes go even further.106 For example, the
states of Washington and Idaho have both enacted provisions indicating that:
[t]he “matters” that may be addressed and resolved through a nonjudicial
procedure are broadly defined and include any issue, question, or dispute
involving: (i) the determination of any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs,
next of kin, or other persons interested in an estate, trust, nonprobate asset, or with
respect to any other asset or property interest passing at death; (ii) the direction of
a personal representative or trustee to do or to abstain from doing any act in a
fiduciary capacity; (iii) the determination of any question arising in the
administration of an estate or trust or with respect to any nonprobate assets or any
See UTC, supra note 7, §111, cmt. The term “interested persons” is defined as meaning “persons
whose consent would be required in order to achieve a binding settlement were the settlement to be
approved by the court.” Id., §111(a).
104
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arbitration under Section 111 (since the powers listed in Section 816 are not said to be exclusive to the
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“[s]ettlors wishing to encourage use of alternate dispute resolution may draft to provide it.” Id., §816(23),
cmt. (referring parties to the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules for sample language).
105
Trustees could attempt to enter into individual arbitration agreements with potential parties to an
internal dispute after the creation of the trust but before a dispute arises, but that approach is logistically
and jurisprudentially difficult. See Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 8.
106
See UTC, supra note 7, §111.
103

26

other asset or property interest passing at death, including, without limitation,
questions relating to the construction of wills, trusts, community property
agreements, or other writings, a change of personal representative or trustee, a
change of the situs of a trust, an accounting from a personal representative or
trustee, or the determination of fees for a personal representative or trustee; (iv) the
grant to a personal representative or trustee of any necessary or desirable power
not otherwise granted in the governing instrument or given by law; and (v) the
amendment, reformation, or conformation of a will or trust instrument to comply
with statutes and regulations of the Internal Revenue Code in order to achieve
qualification for deductions, elections, and other tax requirements.107
These statutes obviously go beyond what the UTC contemplates in terms of arbitrable
concerns. However, the Washington and Idaho statutes suffer from the same problem that the
UTC did, namely ambiguity with respect to who may invoke arbitration and how.108 Although it
would again seem incongruous to permit arbitration of such a wide range of internal matters
without providing an appropriate mechanism by which to invoke such proceedings, no court has
yet considered whether these statutes permit arbitration based on a clause found in the trust itself.
English law takes a somewhat different approach. While U.S. statutes focus on the types
of claims that may be settled by arbitration – thus leaving open the question of whether
arbitration may be sought only by the trustee after the creation of the trust or can be mandated in
the trust itself by the settlor – English law explicitly states that powers relating to nonjudicial
dispute resolution are limited to the trustee. Thus, the Trustee Act 1925 states that:
[a] personal representative, or two or more trustees acting together, or, subject to
the restrictions imposed in regard to receipts by a sole trustee not being a trust
corporation, a sole acting trustee where by the instrument, if any, creating the
trust, or by statute, a sole trustee is authorised to execute the trusts and powers
reposed in him, may, if and as he or they think fit—
...
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(f) compromise, compound, abandon, submit to arbitration, or otherwise settle
any debt, account, claim, or thing whatever relating to the testator’s or intestate’s
estate or to the trust;
and for any of those purposes may enter into, give, execute, and do such
agreements, instruments of composition or arrangement, releases, and other things
as to him or them seem expedient, without being responsible for any loss
occasioned by any act or thing so done by him or them if he has or they have
discharged the duty of care set out in section 1(1) of the Trustee Act 2000.109
Interestingly, although the English statute is limited as to who may authorize the
arbitration, the language is quite broad with respect to the types of claims that can be asserted in
arbitration (“any debt, account, claim, or thing whatever relating to . . . the trust”).110 This allows
parties to claim that most, if not all, trust-related issues are inherently arbitrable, a position that
may be very useful if English courts come to recognize that settlors have the power to require
arbitration of disputes arising out of or in connection to the trusts that they create.111

(c)

States Without Legislation Concerning Trust Arbitration

While some states have addressed trust arbitration by statute, the vast majority of jurisdictions
have not. To make matters worse, there is no clear judicial consensus regarding which types of
internal trust disputes are arbitrable, primarily because most courts considering trust-related
arbitration focus their discussions almost entirely on the enforceability of an arbitration provision
found in a trust rather than on the arbitrability of particular issues.112 Therefore, while several
recent U.S. state court decisions clearly indicate that arbitration clauses in trusts are
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unenforceable, they do so on grounds other than arbitrability.113 On the other hand, a number of
older decisions that once acted as significant stumbling blocks in the United States to both the
arbitrability of internal trust disputes and the enforceability of arbitration provisions in trusts
have recently been abrogated either judicially or legislatively, thus allowing arbitration of
internal trust disputes in those states.114
Parties find themselves in a difficult position if they are considering either of these two
questions – arbitrability or enforceability – in a jurisdiction without relevant legislation, since
there is a widespread perception that precedent in this area of law is “thin and
underdeveloped”115 despite the recent introduction of a number of relevant decisions into the
legal literature.116 This shortage – real or perceived – of controlling case law has led many
members of the trust bench and bar to adopt views that are “more conservative towards ADR
than the law actually is today,” even though the lack of subject-specific precedent would
normally suggest “that the general principles of arbitration law . . . should apply equally to trust
cases.”117
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In fact, arbitration law provides courts considering an internal trust dispute as a matter of
first impression with a very simple and straightforward method of analysis. For example,
arbitration law indicates that judges should begin by referring to the national statute on
arbitration to determine whether internal trust disputes comply with basic principles of
arbitrability. Some states take such a broad view of arbitrability that few, if any, problems
should arise with respect to arbitration of internal trust disputes.118 Thus, for example:
Switzerland has adopted an independent substantive rule for the determination of
arbitrability, according to which any dispute involving an economic/financial
interest may be settled by arbitration, without any need to consider the possible
stricter rules of the law applicable to the merits of the dispute or the national law
of one of the parties. Apart from purely non-financial matters, arbitrability can
only be denied in an international arbitration with its seat in Switzerland for
claims which have exclusively been reserved for the state courts pursuant to
foreign mandatory provisions which have to be taken into account under public
policy considerations.
As nearly all types of trust disputes ultimately concern the distribution of
private wealth, the majority of such disputes can be arbitrated given the
liberal definition of arbitrability under Swiss law.119
Notably, this does not mean that every trust-related dispute is arbitrable under Swiss law.
For example, in addition to situations involving statutes conferring courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over certain matters (a subject that is discussed further below),120 Swiss courts may
refuse arbitration of issues relating to the provision of information to a beneficiary pursuant to a
judicial accounting process, since such disputes might not involve the kind of financial or
economic interests contemplated under Swiss provisions on arbitrability.121
A number of other jurisdictions also focus on commercial or economic interests when
considering arbitrability and thus might come to the same conclusion that Switzerland does
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regarding arbitration of internal trust disputes.122 Some states, such as Liechtenstein, even go so
far as to make arbitration compulsory in cases involving foreign trust deeds.123
Although courts considering the arbitrability of internal trust disputes should refer first to
the national statute on arbitration, that approach does not work in all cases. Some countries –
including two of the key jurisdictions in this area of law, England and the United States – do not
discuss arbitrability in their national arbitration statutes.124 States whose laws are based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitration Law) may
find themselves in a similar situation, since the Model Arbitration Law is also silent on
arbitrability.125 In situation such as these, “questions whether or not a particular dispute is
arbitrable . . . turn almost entirely on judicial interpretation of other statutes” or on general case
law.126
A full discussion regarding the arbitrability of internal trust disputes in the United States,
England and other jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, commentators
have considered that issue at length and have taken the position that internal trust disputes are for
the most part arbitrable.127
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IV.
INCREASING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF A MANDATORY
ARBITRATION PROVISION IN A TRUST THROUGH ADOPTION OF
PARTICULAR PROCEDURAL PROCESSES
The preceding section introduced the various types of disputes that can arise with respect to the
inner workings of a trust and outlined the extent to which those matters are considered arbitrable.
However, that discussion also demonstrated some of the difficulties associated with establishing
arbitration through a clause found in the trust itself, primarily because of inadequate statutory
provisions on whether a settlor may require arbitration of internal trust disputes by including an
arbitration provision in the trust itself. Although an increasing number of courts and legislatures
are addressing this issue, most of the relevant analysis is found in scholarly commentary. These
authorities have generally concluded that a court may enforce a mandatory arbitration provision
in a trust if:
(1) the court’s jurisdiction is not ousted in an unacceptable fashion;
(2) the provision purporting to require arbitration is not inoperable, ineffective or
incapable of being performed and covers the dispute at issue;
(3) the clause is binding on the party seeking to avoid arbitration;
(4) all interested parties, including unascertained, unborn and legally incompetent
beneficiaries, are properly represented in the proceeding; and
(5) the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable.128
The enumeration of these five factors is very helpful, since it allows settlors to identify
the possible means of affecting a court’s determination about enforceability. Interestingly,
settlors appear able to influence judicial determinations regarding two issues – the operability of
the arbitral clause purporting to require arbitration and the ability of that clause to bind any party
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seeking to avoid arbitration – through language used in the arbitration provision itself.129
Furthermore, settlors might be able to influence how a court analyzes the three remaining
concerns – arbitrability, potential ouster of the courts and proper representation of the parties –
based on procedures chosen by the settlor to be used in the arbitration itself. Each of these three
criteria is discussed individually below.

(a)

Arbitrability

In some ways, it may seem strange to consider the extent to which a party can affect a court’s
determination regarding questions of arbitrability, given that arbitrability is quintessentially a
state concern and thus not usually considered amenable to external influences.130 However,
judges may be more willing to consider certain matters arbitrable if the parties can demonstrate
that the procedures used in the arbitration were or will be fair. This conclusion is based on the
observation that the concept of arbitrability in international commercial arbitration has expanded
as arbitral procedures have become more demonstrably fair and objective.131 While there is no
way to establish a causal relationship between the two factors – i.e., that courts and legislatures
increased the scope of issues that are considered arbitrable because of an increase in the number
and quality of procedural protections for parties – there does seem to be a temporal and hence
logical connection between the two developments.132 Therefore, it can be supposed that internal
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trust disputes are more likely to be considered arbitrable if the parties can show that the
procedures to be used are fair and adequate as a matter of trust law.
One of the more distinctive types of issues that could arise in mandatory trust arbitration
involves what may be called the principle of “limited non-arbitrability.” While limited nonarbitrability is a somewhat narrow issue, it is nevertheless critical to the development of
arbitration of internal trust disputes.
The first thing to do is explain what is meant by the term “limited non-arbitrability.”
Traditionally, the core of any arbitrability analysis turns on whether a certain category of claims
is or should be reserved to the courts.133 For years, this determined focused on entire subject
matter areas, with states concluding that all claims in a certain field, such as intellectual property,
securities or consumer law, were non-arbitrable.134 However, as the general scope of
arbitrability has expanded, the number of suspect subject matters has diminished. Few fields of
law are currently considered categorically off-limits. Instead, judges are now being asked to
undertake more nuanced analyses to determine the arbitrability of certain limited subsets of
claims that fall within a field that is generally considered arbitrable.135
One of the best illustrations of the concept of limited non-arbitrability arises in the
context of agency, franchise and exclusive distributor disputes. As a general matter, disputes
involving these sorts of commercial relationships can be made subject to arbitration.136
However, some courts have refused to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements in cases
involving termination of the rights of agents, franchisees or exclusive distributors.137 Notably,
this limitation on arbitrability only affects specific types of claims in this particular field,
133
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creating a sub-class of non-arbitrable issues within a subject matter that is generally considered
arbitrable.
This phenomenon is relevant to mandatory trust arbitration for two reasons. First, limited
non-arbitrability is applied in the context of agency, franchise and exclusive distribution disputes
in order to protect certain vulnerable parties.138 Trust disputes can also involve potential power
disparities, either in situations where beneficiaries to certain types of commercial trusts are
considered akin to consumers139 or in cases involving unborn, unascertained or legally
incompetent beneficiaries.
Second, limitations on the arbitrability of certain types of agency, franchise or
distribution claims are typically based on statutes that either (1) require the application of certain
substantive laws that may rise to the level of “conflict mandatory rules or . . . part of the ordre
public”140 or (2) grant state courts exclusive jurisdiction over that particular issue.141 Trust law is
full of legislation establishing similar types of substantive and procedural rights.142 Although
these types of provisions could on their face seem fatal to the arbitrability of disputes falling
within the terms of the statute, there are two different ways of interpreting this type of
legislation. A strict reading of these provisions would bar resolution of a particular issue in all
other fora, arbitral or judicial.143 However, these sorts of statutes can also be read merely as
138
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prohibitions on foreign forum selection clauses, meaning that if the claim is heard in court, then
it must be heard in that particular court. This latter approach would leave open the possibility of
having the claim heard in arbitration.
Courts considering claims involving the termination of agency, franchise and exclusive
distribution relationships have not come to a consensus on the proper interpretation of these sorts
of laws in that field.144 Such determinations would in any case not be binding on judges
considering mandatory trust arbitration, since the two analyses are likely different enough to
allow courts considering trust disputes to distinguish precedent regarding commercial
relationships. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider how various courts have considered this issue
in the commercial context, in case some analogies to trust arbitration exist.
The first notable issue is that courts faced with a potentially non-arbitrable issue in the
context of an agency, franchise or exclusive distributorship relationship often consider whether
and to what extent a mandatory provision of the forum state’s substantive law will be applied
extraterritorially.145 Because arbitrators are often seen as either more likely or more able to
apply the mandatory laws of a state other than that chosen by the parties to govern the dispute,
some courts have been willing to allow arbitration of these suspect issues.146 However, courts
have appeared less inclined to enforce foreign forum selection clauses in similar circumstances
because foreign courts are often perceived as less able or less likely to apply mandatory
principles of foreign substantive law.147
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This analytical approach does appear to have some relevance to multijurisdictional trust
disputes, which can involve similar conflict of laws concerns regarding matters of substantive
law.148 Indeed, it already appears as if Swiss courts will adopt a strict interpretation of exclusive
jurisdiction statutes rather than the alternate reading.149
However, trust arbitration adds a second unique quirk to this line of analysis based on the
fact that trust law not only involves special substantive laws, but also certain special procedures
relating to the resolution of trust disputes.150 Indeed, it is altogether possible that some judges
may take the view that some of these procedures constitute a type of mandatory law analogous to
the ordre public,151 even though rules of civil procedure – particularly those of a state other than
the arbitral seat – are traditionally considered non-applicable in arbitration.152 While no cases
appear to have discussed this issue yet, parties to trust disputes should nevertheless be aware that
some courts might undertake a similar conflict of laws analysis regarding questions of procedural
law.153
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The conflict of laws approach is only one way to address issues relating to the potentially
mandatory nature of certain substantive and procedural laws relating to trusts. A second method
of analysis also exists, based on the unique historical factors that drove the development of trust
law and procedure.
Traditionally, trust law has operated as a field apart, not only in terms of its procedural
and substantive law, but also in terms of the venue in which trust-related matters are heard.
Many jurisdictions still require claims regarding the administration and interpretation of trusts to
be brought in a special probate or chancery court, a practice that dates back to medieval England,
when trust disputes were heard exclusively in the courts of equity, which were then separate
from courts of law.154 Though the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1893 eliminated the legal
distinctions between law and equity, England’s Chancery Division still retains exclusive
jurisdiction over trust-related concerns,155 a practice followed by a number of other common-law
countries.156
Rules regarding venue are found in statutes giving probate and chancery courts sole
jurisdiction over trust matters.157 However, these provisions could not have been originally
intended to bar arbitration because arbitration was relatively uncommon at the time these courts
first developed in medieval England. Instead, this type of legislation was intended to and did act
as a type of internal sorting mechanism within the national judicial system, directing trust
disputes to one particular venue. Furthermore, many of the historic rationales supporting the use
of specialty courts (i.e., the desire to take trust-related disputes away from the jury and give them
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to decision-makers with specialized substantive and procedural expertise) would be equally well
met by arbitration.158 As such, it seems inappropriate to conclude that exclusive jurisdiction
statutes in the trust context were or are meant to exclude either domestic or international
arbitration.
Obviously, there is much more that could be said about limited non-arbitrability in the
context of mandatory trust arbitration, although such discussions are beyond the scope of this
Article.159 At this point, it is enough to note that there are no clear guidelines to determine how a
particular court will decide these sorts of issues. Nevertheless, settlors should keep two points in
mind as the law in this area develops.
First, because determinations regarding limited non-arbitrability are often driven by
concerns regarding the application of certain principles of mandatory law, settlors should
explicitly adopt procedures that give arbitrators the ability to consider and, if necessary, apply
mandatory laws of countries other than that whose law the parties are generally seeking to have
apply.160 In so doing, settlors may want to incorporate a conflict of laws approach similar to that
reflected in the Hague Convention on Trusts, since that instrument reflects an internationally
recognized means of addressing conflict of laws issues relating to trusts.161 While the Hague
Convention on Trusts does not provide answers to all possible concerns (such as which rules of
158
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law are to be considered non-derogable or are to be given extraterritorial application), it does
usefully describe the factors relevant to the determination of the law that is most closely
connected with the trust and could be helpful to the extent that it suggests to the court that the
settlor did not choose arbitration as a means of escaping mandatory rules of substantive law.162
Second, settlors should be aware that judges may consider procedural laws relating to
trust disputes to be as important as substantive laws, with both possibly rising to the level of
public policy. Since arbitral procedures that closely resemble judicial procedures cannot be said
to be unfair in any way,163 settlors wishing to minimize potential problems arising out of the
principle of limited non-arbitrability may be well-advised to adopt somewhat more formal
procedures vis-à-vis trust arbitration, at least until the device is more widely accepted. While it
is true that mirroring judicial processes too closely might lead to the charge that settlors are
“fail[ing] to engage with the possibilities of . . . arbitration,”164 this sort of approach has the
benefit of addressing any judicial concerns about the fairness of the procedures used to resolve
trust disputes.
As this discussion has shown, questions regarding limited non-arbitrability can become
quite complicated.165 Nevertheless, even this brief analysis has suggested ways that a settlor can
positively affect the arbitrability analysis through adoption of certain arbitral procedures.

(b)

Impermissible Ouster of the Court’s Jurisdiction
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The next issue to consider involves the question of whether mandatory arbitration of internal
trust disputes impermissibly ousts the jurisdiction of the court.166 At first glance, this also
appears to be an issue over which settlors have little control. However, closer consideration
suggests several ways in which settlors can influence a court’s analysis of this issue.
Discussion regarding the impermissible ouster of the court’s jurisdiction begins with the
recognition that courts have traditionally exercised uniquely broad powers over the
administration of trusts.167 Thus, for example:
[t]rust procedure law may be described as a three-tier structure. The routine phase
is periodic judicial accounting. The accounting informs the beneficiaries,
enabling them to enforce their rights. The accounting also provides closure for
trustees on current installments of these long-duration undertakings. Because,
however, judicial accountings can be costly and clumsy, drafters sometimes prefer
to alter the default regime in favor of nonjudicial accountings.
The second procedural level, for situations of uncertainty or dispute, is judicial
instruction. The trust tradition has been precocious in allowing the parties,
typically the trustee, early resort to authoritative judicial guidance.
Finally, if litigation arises, it is tried to the judge, sitting without a jury. 168
Several possible rationales can be used to justify the court’s expansive jurisdiction over
trusts. One posits that the court assumes broad jurisdictional powers as a means of protecting
beneficiaries from overreaching from the trustee.169 Thus, for example, it is usually “a nonexcludable feature of a trust that the trustee’s administration of the fund must be, directly or
indirectly, subject to the supervision of the court.”170
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The key principle here “is that the trustee must be sufficiently accountable so that his
status as the non-beneficial owner of the assets vested in him is practically real.”171 However,
“effective accountability does not mean that the trustees can be accountable only to the court
rather than to some other body which has power to enquire into the trustees’ administration of
the fund and to require them to abide by the terms of the trust instrument.”172 Arbitration can be
an equally effective means of curbing any abuse by the trustee. In fact, objections from the
beneficiaries regarding the procedure adopted “would only have weight if the beneficiaries were
denied any effective means of enforcing their interests against the trustees. If the ADR
procedure had effective machinery for enforcing the outcome of the determination against the
trustees, then it seems that this objection would not hold.”173
Although a number of commentators consider mandatory trust arbitration as a legitimate
means of holding trustees accountable to beneficiaries, of the trust bench and bar often take a
more conservative view based on longstanding precedent that is hostile to arbitration.174
However, closer analysis of these decisions shows that many of these cases involved trustees
acting as arbitrators.175 Naturally courts found this practice problematic, since trustees were
acting as judges in their own cause and either limiting or eliminating the court’s ability to review
the propriety of the trustee’s decisions and actions.
This is a concern that can easily be addressed by settlors, most notably through the
adoption of procedures that underscore the extent to which contemporary forms of arbitration
require arbitrators to be both independent and impartial. While most, if not all, arbitral rules
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currently mention these principles in general terms, settlors might want to include slightly more
complete descriptions of the principles of independence and impartiality (for example, inserting
a phrase into the arbitral provision noting that independence means that a settlor, trustee,
protector or beneficiary cannot serve as an arbitrator) or explicitly referencing more detailed
standards such as the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration so as to demonstrate to the court the neutrality and objectivity of the
process.176
Another possible technique would be to identify why these procedural protections are
being imposed (for example, incorporating a statement noting that arbitrators must be impartial
and independent so as to ensure a neutral evaluation of the trustee’s activities). Furthermore,
because “[m]any trust practitioners [and judges] have never encountered arbitration,”177 settlors
might also want to adopt explicit language regarding the means by which the tribunal is selected,
again to reinforce notions of independence and eliminate concerns that a trustee would be
permitted to act as an arbitrator in a dispute concerning the trust. Finally, settlors might want to
describe the extent to which the arbitral tribunal is bound to follow the governing law, since
various members of the trust bench and bar have recently raised concerns in this regard.
These types of issues arise with equal vigor in all trust-related disputes. However, two
types of trust procedures – judicial accounting and instruction – give rise to additional concerns,
since they do not resemble traditional forms of arbitration.178 While the mere fact that certain
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procedures are unusual is not necessarily fatal to their being considered amenable to
arbitration,179 any form of novelty requires special consideration.
The first procedure – judicial accounting – is distinguishable from “normal” arbitration to
the extent that judicial accounting procedures can require routine and continuing oversight to
trusts.180 (Notably, some states do not contemplate ongoing jurisdiction, since the duty to
provide an accounting is only triggered by a request from a beneficiary.181) Duties of accounting
exist with respect to commercial as well as other types of trusts.182
Although this type of continuing involvement in a party’s affairs is unusual in arbitration,
it is not unprecedented. For example, some fields – most prominently, the construction industry
– use dispute review boards (also known as dispute resolution boards) to resolve issues that may
arise between parties to a long-term contract.183 Dispute review boards allow arbitrators to gain
an ongoing familiarity with the parties and the nature of the relationship while also providing a
quick and cost-efficient means of resolving small disputes before they escalate into something
more serious. Although some dispute review boards only issue non-binding decisions, there is
nothing to prohibit the parties from creating a binding mechanism.184
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Trusts often reflect the same kind of relational characteristic that is seen in long-term
commercial contracts,185 and a similar type of standing dispute resolution mechanism could be
used in the trust context to deal with ongoing issues such as judicial accounting. Because the
members of the board would be either appointed by a neutral body (such as an arbitral
institution) or by both proponents of the trust or accounting procedure (i.e., the trustee) and those
whose interests would be expected to be adverse to the trust or the accounting procedure (i.e., the
beneficiaries),186 such a process would comply with contemporary requirements for procedural
fairness regarding the selection of arbitrators and would allow the trustee to be held accountable
to the beneficiaries.
The second procedure – judicial instruction – runs into difficulties because arbitration
typically does not involve the granting of advisory opinions. However, requests for judicial
instruction could be considered akin to requests for declarative or injunctive relief, which are
arbitrable in many jurisdictions.187 This is particularly true to the extent that a request for
judicial instruction leads to final resolution of a particular issue, since such a determination
would resemble other types of decisions leading to a partial final award.188
Notably, no conceptual problems arise simply because a party might make more than one
request for judicial instruction during the life of an individual trust, since there is no requirement
that arbitration be used only once by a particular set of parties. In cases where a series of
disputes is possible, the parties can provide for the matters to be heard by different tribunals or

185

See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 631, 653-54.
See Michael A. Marra, The Construction Industry Guide to Dispute Avoidance and Resolution, 567
PLI/REAL. 525, 541-42 (May 7, 2009).
187
See BORN, supra note 118, at 2478-79.
188
Although arbitration is best suited to disputes that address all of the matters outstanding between the
parties, arbitral tribunals can render partial final awards that provide binding resolution of some discrete
aspect of a larger dispute. See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 124, §47; BORN, supra note 118, at 243033.
186

45

by the same tribunal, either under the auspices of a standing dispute review board or through the
reappointment of the same arbitrators that heard the first matter. However, because some courts
might take the view that a second arbitration involves “strangers” to the first proceeding, even if
the parties and the arbitrators are the same,189 settlors should consider adopting procedural
provisions that outline whether and to what extent a later tribunal can consider arguments and
evidence presented to an earlier tribunal so as to avoid problems with respect to the
confidentiality of previous proceedings and the preclusive value of earlier awards.190
Another way to analyze judicial instruction in arbitration is to view such procedures as
constituting a form of interim provisional relief.191 Interestingly, this approach could lead to
even fewer problems as a matter of arbitral jurisprudence, since courts and arbitral tribunals have
long been viewed as holding concurrent jurisdiction over requests for these kinds of relief.192
Therefore, allowing either a tribunal or a court to hear matters involving judicial instruction
could be seen as consistent with practices elsewhere in arbitration.
Concerns might be raised with respect to arbitration of matters relating to judicial
accounting or instruction to the extent that arbitration law only considers final awards to be
immediately enforceable and some awards arising out of a judicial accounting or instruction
procedure might not be considered “final.”193 However, this does not appear to be unduly
problematic, since some of the issues that are at stake in accounting and instruction procedures
are obviously not intended to constitute a final determination of the rights and responsibilities
189
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between the parties.194 Those matters that do involve final determination of a discrete issue
would appear to be adequately covered by existing law regarding partial final awards.195
All of this suggests that arbitration can provide an appropriate mechanism for resolving
issues relating to judicial accounting and instruction, a conclusion that is bolstered by a 2007
decision from the California Court of Appeal, Roehl v. Ritchie.196 The dispute there involved a
series of awards rendered by a sole arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration provision contained in a
family trust. Although the arbitrator was dealing with ongoing accounting issues, the court
demonstrated no conceptual difficulty with allowing such matters to be addressed in arbitration,
based on precedent that allowed “the utilization of a multiple incremental or successive award
process as a means, in an appropriate case, of finally deciding all submitted issues.”197 In
reaching its conclusion, the court also noted that:
“the ongoing and changing nature of trust administration” may require ongoing
proceedings “for instructions, to settle accounts, to fix compensation . . . [and] to
allow, compromise or settle claims.” The arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in
fashioning a remedy to resolve ongoing matters relating to Trust administration
costs and fees.198
This suggests that arbitrators may properly address all types of disputes associated with
trusts, including those dealing with accounting or judicial instruction. Such procedures will not
impermissibly oust the court’s jurisdiction so long as the procedures allow independent scrutiny
of the trustee’s decisions.
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(c)

Proper Representation of the Parties

The third issue to consider involves the need to ensure that all interested parties are properly
represented in the proceedings.199 Here, the biggest problem involves actual or potential
beneficiaries who may be unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent at the time the dispute
arises.200
This is quite likely a novel issue for many commercial lawyers, since very few areas of
law require judges or arbitrators to consider the rights of persons who are not actually present in
the dispute. Although there are some exceptions, most notably the representative class action
and its corollary, the class arbitration, which both involve a few named individuals bringing a
claim on behalf of a large number of unnamed others,201 trust disputes are not representative in
nature.202 Instead, trust disputes proceed in rem, with decisions binding “all persons having
199
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adequate notice, whether or not they actually participate in the proceeding.”203 This obviously
puts significant pressure on judges and arbitrators to adopt procedural mechanisms that properly
ascertain who should have notice of a trust proceeding, how notice should be provided and how
the rights of all interested parties, including those who are not present, are to be protected during
the hearing phase.204
The first task – identifying who should be given notice of a trust dispute – requires a
careful reading of the trust document as well as a detailed knowledge of the context in which the
trust is operating, since some beneficiaries may not be identified in the trust by name. Although
this practice may seem unusual, it is quite common in trusts and arises out of the desire to
provide settlors with maximum flexibility in setting up their trusts.205 For example, a settlor
contemplating a long-term trust may decide to identify beneficiaries by class so as to ensure that
all relevant persons are captured within the trust provisions.206 Alternatively, a settlor may want
to give the trustee the discretion to determine who a beneficiary is or whether a disbursement
under the trust is necessary.207 Requiring all these elements to be spelled out in the trust would
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mean that the document would not only be quite cumbersome but would also have to be
constantly amended to take changing circumstances into account. In some cases, it would be
impossible to provide the requisite amount of specificity at the time the trust was created.208 In
either event, the flexibility of the trust would be severely curtailed.
The trust document is only one source of information about potential parties to a trust
dispute. Sometimes people’s interest in the trust and in the dispute arise as a matter of law.
Usually these claims are based on certain aspects of either marital or succession law that prohibit
property from being distributed in certain ways.209 Although these types of issues may be
perceived as arising most often in the context of private family trusts, questions regarding marital
and succession rights can also arise in the context of commercial trusts.210
Some potential claimants will be ascertainable as soon as it is determined that a right may
arise under the trust or under a statute. For example, the settlor’s spouse can easily be identified
by name and can come forward in his or her own capacity once a dispute is filed and notice is
given. However, there will be times when a court may be able to identify a potential party by
relationship but may not be able to bring any actual, living person into the dispute because the
real party in interest is unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent at the time the dispute
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arises.211 In litigated disputes, the problem has been resolved by allowing the court “to appoint a
person to represent the interests of such beneficiaries,” although “even then, any compromise of
the litigation has to be approved by the court.”212 In England, the person named to protect the
beneficiaries’ claims, called a “special representative,” cannot have any personal interest in the
dispute itself.213 Other jurisdictions, such as the United States, either appoint an independent
representative similar to a special representative or allow an existing beneficiary who shares the
absent beneficiary’s interests to protect the absent beneficiary’s claims in a practice known as
“virtual representation.”214 Minors and other legally incompetent persons (such as the mentally
incapacitated) may have a legal representative, typically referred to as a guardian, appointed if
such a person is not already in place.215 The question therefore becomes whether these sorts of
representative mechanisms can be used in arbitration.
The answer may depend on whether the trust instrument or governing procedure
specifically describes the representative mechanism that is to be used. For example, it has been
said that:
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[t]here appears to be no reason why the court would not grant a stay [of litigation]
to the trustee on the sole ground that the beneficiary is not properly represented in
the arbitration. If the arbitration provision is properly drawn to provide for
adequate representation, then the child [or other beneficiary] should be bound to
take the benefit of it.216
However, a trust that specifically describes notice and representation procedures in the
document itself could become quite lengthy, something that is often not advisable as a matter of
arbitration law and procedure.217 Instead, it may be better to devise special arbitral rules outside
of the trust itself describing how unascertained, unborn and legally incompetent beneficiaries can
come (or be brought) forward to make their claims.218 Either way, the arbitral clause or
procedural rules should also provide for the payment of special or virtual representatives out of
the trust fund.219
Trustees who are not given explicit powers to appoint special or virtual representatives in
the trust or governing arbitral rules could attempt to do so based on their residual discretionary
powers under the trust. Although this approach has not been frequently discussed by
commentators and may therefore be somewhat open to debate, trustees wishing to take on this
task could seek to rely on statutory provisions allowing trustees to pursue nonjudicial means of
dispute resolution.220
Even if representatives can be used in arbitration, some potential problems still remain.
For example, questions exist as to whether the arbitral tribunal would have the ability to approve
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the settlement of a trust dispute in cases involving appointed representatives or whether that
power could be exercised only by a court.221 While arbitrators are entirely competent to enter an
award on an agreed settlement as a matter of arbitration law,222 some courts could oppose similar
actions in the trust context on the grounds that the judicial duty to approve the voluntary
disposition of a trust dispute is non-derogable.223 However, some commentators take the view
that the use of representative devices in “nonjudicial dispute resolution procedures has simplified
the settlement process and made it possible to finalize nonjudicial dispute resolution agreements
without having to seek court approval.”224
Challenges could also arise as to the competency of a particular representative. However,
it has been said that “[o]ne can leave it to the good sense of the arbitrator to provide for due
process and a fair hearing by appointing appropriate skilled independent persons to represent
minors and unborn and unascertained beneficiaries.”225
Finally, questions could arise as to whether a representative needs to be appointed in any
particular set of circumstances. For example, a representative might not need to be appointed for
a minor if the minor is receiving a benefit under the trust, since consent to receiving a benefit is
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not necessary in some jurisdictions.226 However, a representative would be necessary in cases
where a conflict of interest existed between a minor beneficiary and his or her natural guardian
(i.e., the parent).227
It is notable that although numerous questions exist with respect to the procedures that
can or should be used to address the special needs of unborn, unascertained and legally
incompetent beneficiaries, none of the issues is conceptually problematic. Instead, adequate
solutions appear possible with sufficient forethought and care. Therefore it appears as if settlors
can positively influence determinations about the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a
trust by adopting procedures that take the special needs of particularly vulnerable beneficiaries
into account.

V.

ADOPTING VIABLE PROCEDURES FOR MANDATORY TRUST ARBITRATION

As the preceding discussion suggests, mandatory trust arbitration gives rise to a number of issues
that would benefit from special arbitral procedures. These procedures could be adopted in one of
several ways. First, settlors could attempt to address each of these items in an arbitration
provision located in the trust itself. However, experts in arbitration do not encourage drafters to
adopt these sorts of lengthy, ad hoc provisions, since the use of non-standard language can lead
to disputes over the scope and interpretation of the operative terms.228 This sort of approach
would also not permit easy and inexpensive amendment of the procedures to take new legal
developments into account, as would be the case if the detailed provisions were found in a
separate set of arbitral rules.229 Furthermore, this type of clause might be difficult to draft at the
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time of trust creation, since the settlor may not want to pay for a lawyer to draw up an
individualized dispute resolution mechanism that the settlor may not believe is necessary.
Second, settlors could leave the nuances of arbitral procedure to the discretion of the
arbitral tribunal, although this sort of approach suffers somewhat from a lack of transparency and
predictability. Because courts may be more inclined to enforce an arbitration provision in a trust
if the judge can be assured of the fairness of the process in advance of any actual proceedings,
settlors may be better served by having key procedures set in place before the arbitration
begins.230 A similar sort of benefit can arise retroactively, in that courts considering the
enforcement of an arbitral award might look favorably on the fact that certain procedures were
known in advance of the arbitration, since parties can thus be said to have been on notice of the
procedures to be used to resolve the dispute.
This strongly suggests that the best approach would be to adopt some sort of preestablished rule set in the arbitration provision located in the trust. Of course, in so doing, the
settlor is not required to have arbitral procedures that have been drafted especially for use in trust
disputes. Indeed, a number of internal trust disputes arising out of mandatory arbitration
provisions in a trust instrument have utilized the general rules of the AAA, the ICC and the
ICDR.231 However, none of these standard rule sets specifically addresses any of the various
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trust-related concerns outlined in this Article. While this is not fatal to the use of these rules,
since the tribunal can always tailor the procedures pursuant to the general grant of discretion
contained in each of the rule sets,232 this kind of broad reliance on arbitral discretion again robs
the court of the opportunity to appreciate independently the extent to which the procedures used
in the arbitration safeguard important principles of procedural fairness.
However, settlors do not have to rely on general institutions rules, since the AAA has
specifically designed a dedicated set of arbitral procedures – the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules –
to address the unique challenges associated with the arbitration of trust disputes.233 These rules
are analyzed in detail below. However, a second set of specialized procedures – the DIS
Supplementary Rules – might also provide useful ideas for proponents of trust arbitration, since
the DIS rules address a type of collective arbitration that is in many ways similar to mandatory
trust arbitration.234 Therefore, the DIS Supplementary Rules are discussed below as well.

(a)

The AAA Trust Arbitration Rules
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The AAA Trust Arbitration Rules were first published in 2003, with various revisions having
been made in the intervening years.235 Although the title of the rules clearly demonstrates that
the AAA meant to address the special challenges associated with trust arbitration, no one has
ever analyzed the extent to which the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules achieve that objective. The
following discussion aims to fill that analytical gap.236

(i)

Applicability

The first thing to consider is how the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules may be invoked. According
to Rule 1, the settlor of a trust can adopt the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules either by mentioning
the rules by name in the trust or by invoking institutional arbitration with the AAA without
reference to any particular AAA rule set.237 Reference to the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules may
be made in the trust itself, thus triggering the obligation to resolve future disputes involving
matters internal to the trust through arbitration, although the rules can also be adopted in existing
disputes.238 The AAA provides a model arbitration clause for inclusion in the trust, although that
clause appears to restrict unnecessarily the scope of issues that are considered amenable to
arbitration.239
Although Rule 1 appears straightforward on its face, implicitly or even explicitly
invoking the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules does not necessarily mean that any ensuing arbitration
will be governed by those procedures. Instead, the AAA will override the settlor’s choice of
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procedures if the relationship between the parties appears to be consumer in nature. In those
cases, the dispute will proceed under the AAA Supplementary Rules on Consumer-Related
Disputes (AAA Consumer Rules).240 While parties are permitted to bring any concerns about the
application of the AAA Consumer Rules to the arbitrator, there is no guarantee that their
objections will prevail, since the decision to use the AAA Consumer Rules resides solely with
the AAA.241 Although the intent is obviously to protect small, individual parties from what
might be seen as unnecessarily complex procedures, this approach is troubling because it
eliminates the application of any special trust-related procedures that are presumably contained
in the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules. The provision is also problematic as a matter of trust law,
since one of the primary rules of trust construction is to give effect to the intent of the settlor
unless to do so would contravene positive law or public policy.242
Of course, the immediate response is that the settlor can be said to have agreed to the use
of the AAA Consumer Rules in appropriate cases, since the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules
explicitly contemplate such a possibility. Use of the AAA Consumer Rules may also be seen as
necessary in light of the special public policy concerns relating to consumer arbitration. Indeed,
some trust commentators approve of the AAA’s approach to consumer-oriented arbitration,
based on worries about overreaching on the part of professional trustees involved in overseeing
certain commercial trusts, since those trusts are sometimes seen as operating largely at the
discretion of the professional trustee rather than at the direction of the settlors.243
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However, it is not yet clear whether this default rule is necessary, given that there has
been no suggestion that the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules are in any way unfair to small users.
Furthermore, there has been no evidence that any purported overreaching on the part of a trustee
of a commercial trust is any different than overreaching by any other trustee. Indeed, although
some people may view settlor-beneficiaries to commercial trusts as consumers, it may be more
apt to view these persons as analogous to corporate shareholders, since they are “buying into” the
trust in much the same way that corporate shareholders purchase corporate shares. As such,
settlor-beneficiaries of these types of trusts might be seen as more sophisticated than other types
of consumers and therefore might be subject to somewhat different rules and presumptions.244
Given these and other questions, it seems inappropriate to assume automatically that the AAA
Consumer Rules would be the best means of resolving an internal trust dispute.
The AAA also alters certain aspects of the standard AAA Trust Arbitration Rules in cases
involving particularly large disputes, with Rule 8 indicating that the arbitration will proceed
under the AAA Supplementary Procedures for Large, Complex Disputes (AAA Complex
Dispute Procedures) whenever the claim or counterclaim exceeds $1 million and at least one
party has requested use of those procedures.245 Parties may also jointly agree to the application
of the AAA Complex Dispute Procedures, regardless of the amount at issue.246 In both
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instances, application of the AAA’s Complex Dispute Procedures is subject also to the AAA’s
discretion.247
The AAA Complex Dispute Procedures are not lengthy and primarily involve slightly
different procedures regarding certain administrative concerns, such as those involving the
number of arbitrators and the form of the award.248 However, there are some important
differences between the standard AAA Trust Arbitration Rules and the AAA Complex Dispute
Procedures.249 As such, the AAA’s approach to the application of these alternative procedures is
problematic because it puts procedural decisions in the hands of the AAA and, to a lesser extent,
the parties, even though trust law has traditionally given precedence to the intent of the settlor in
all matters concerning the trust.

(ii)

Multiparty procedures

One of the primary challenges of trust arbitration involves the possibility of multiparty
disputes.250 Thus, it is not surprising that the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules appear to take this
issue into account, most visibly in language stating that “[t]he initiating party shall give written
notice to all other parties (hereinafter respondent).”251
While this language properly recognizes that trust disputes can involve more than two
parties, the AAA creates various problems by characterizing anyone who is not initiating the
arbitration as a respondent. Certainly there are benefits to the AAA’s approach, including the
clear delineation of who should work together for purposes of appointing arbitrators and
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submitting any responsive documents. However, this particular technique fails to take into
account the possibility that not all members of the so-called respondent group may be similarly
situated.
This potential for misalignment arises out of the diverse nature of the parties to a trust
dispute. For example, trust-related controversies can involve the original or successor trustee(s),
the original or successor protector(s), some or all of the beneficiaries (including perhaps some
persons who are unborn, unascertained or legally incompetent) and possibly even parties external
to the trust, such as advisors, agents or persons with statutory claims hostile to the existence of
the trust.252 Requiring all of these individuals to act together to choose an arbitrator or file a
single response would be inappropriate in some cases, since some of these late-joined parties
could have interests that align more naturally with those of the claimant.
The AAA Trust Arbitration Rules also run into difficulties to the extent that they fail to
mention whether and to what extent claimants must provide statutory notice based on provisions
found in any relevant probate or family law statute. The rules are also silent with respect to the
appointment of representatives for parties who are unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent
at the time the dispute arises.253 While these issues could be addressed by the arbitral tribunal on
an ad hoc, discretionary basis,254 such omissions are striking in a rule set that purports to take the
special needs of trust disputes into account.
The AAA Trust Arbitration Rules struggle with multiparty issues in other ways as well.
For example, the rules indicate that “[a]ny person having a direct interest in the arbitration is
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entitled to attend hearings.”255 While this phrase may refer only to persons who have been
formally joined in the proceedings, the language could be interpreted to include potential parties
who have not yet officially joined the arbitration even though they have an interest in the
outcome of the dispute.256 However, because the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules do not discuss
how notice would be given to these sorts of potentially interested but currently non-participating
parties, any right to attend a hearing would likely be in name only.257
This raises a related problem, namely that some parties to a trust dispute may only wish
to join or need to be joined at some point late in the proceedings. However, the AAA does not
address the issue of late joinder.
The AAA Trust Arbitration Rules have difficulty dealing not only with late-arriving
parties but also with late-arising claims. For example, the AAA states that no new or different
claim can be submitted by a party without the consent of the arbitrator.258 While this may be a
standard provision in other types of arbitral rules, the special nature of trust disputes makes such
restrictions potentially problematic, since not all parties may be similarly situated toward the
dispute. This is particularly true given the mechanical classification of all parties who did not
initiate the claim as respondents.
There is opportunity for improvement in individual cases, since AAA Trust Arbitration
Rules allow both the parties and the arbitral tribunal to craft suitable procedures that are more
narrowly tailored to the dispute at hand.259 Other savings mechanisms also exist, such as the rule
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indicating that if parties joined together in a claimant or respondent group fail to agree on the
selection of an arbitrator, the AAA will appoint such a person.260 However, the overall
impression is that the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules do not make adequate provision for the
unique, multiparty nature of trust disputes.

(iii)

Awards

Another area of concern involves awards. In general, the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules appear to
consider awards arising out of trust arbitration to be similar to awards in any other context.
However, in so doing, the AAA overlooks some significant issues. For example, for an arbitral
award to be enforceable under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), that award must be binding
on the parties (i.e., final).261 However, some awards arising out of mandatory trust arbitration,
particularly those involving judicial instruction and accounting, could have problems meeting the
New York Convention’s test of finality.262 While parties can take steps to increase the
enforceability of individual awards by only submitting suitable issues to the arbitrators, it would
have been helpful if the AAA had addressed this issue in some way.263
The AAA Trust Arbitration Rules also do not seem to recognize any potential problems
with respect to consent awards, instead simply stating that an arbitrator may make such an
260
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award, using language that is very similar to that found in other AAA rule sets.264 This could
create difficulties, since some judges could take the view that approval of any settlement
agreement involving a trust dispute lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts,
particularly if the award affects the rights of unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent
beneficiaries.265 While it is possible to devise procedures that would help assuage any judicial
concerns about coercive settlements,266 the AAA provides no proposals in this regard, suggesting
that this was not an issue that the drafters of the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules considered
independently in light of the applicable principles of trust law.
Other issues also arise. For example, Rule 37 of the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules
requires awards to contain, inter alia, “a summary of the issues, the damages and/or other relief
requested and awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, [and] a statement regarding the
disposition of any statutory claim.”267 Requiring this type of fully reasoned award appears
highly appropriate given the in rem nature of trust proceedings.268 However, the right to a
reasoned award is not guaranteed. Instead, in large cases where the AAA Complex Dispute
Procedures apply, a reasoned award is only required if the parties so agree or if one party
requests such an award and the arbitrator, in his or her discretion, agrees.269 Parties who are
ordered to proceed under the AAA Consumer Rules also lose their opportunity for a reasoned
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award as of right.270 These procedural distinctions are deeply troubling, not only because they
are entirely unpredictable when viewed from the time of trust creation, but because they deny
parties of the right to a reasoned award even though that kind of such an award is essential in an
in rem type of proceeding.

(iv)

No waiver

One aspect of the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules is quite beneficial to parties to trust disputes.
According to Rule 40(a), “[n]o judicial proceeding by a party relating to the subject matter of the
arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to arbitrate.”271 Although the same
language appears in other AAA rule sets and therefore may be somewhat standard,272 a nonwaiver provision is particularly helpful in the trust context because parties in some jurisdictions
may need to apply to the court for assistance with certain trust-related matters.273 While different
jurisdictions will take different views regarding the need for judicial intervention on these
various issues, the AAA provides useful protection to parties who want to protect their ability to
arbitrate their disputes.274

(v)

Fees

Although issues regarding fees may not seem “procedural” per se, the AAA Trust Arbitration
Rules contain some useful language that may help protect mandatory arbitration from claims that
270

See AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 240, C-7.
AAA Trust Arbitration Rules, supra note 17, rule 40(a).
272
See AAA Commercial Rules, supra note 232, R-48(a).
273
For example, a party may need to seek judicial instruction on a particular point of law or need
assistance appointing special or virtual representatives. Alternatively, parties may need to seek judicial
approval of consent awards.
274
This type of non-waiver provision also protects the settlor’s desire to have all proper disputes heard in
arbitration, since it stops parties from intentionally initiating litigation simply to eliminate the obligation
to arbitrate.
271

65

such procedures impermissibly oust the jurisdiction of the court by making access to justice
prohibitively expensive.275 This provision, which is found in Rule 41, states that “[t]he AAA
may, in the event of extreme hardship on the part of any party, defer or reduce the administrative
fees” otherwise payable to the AAA.276 While similar language is found in other AAA rules, the
fact that the provision is somewhat standard does not make it any less useful in the context of
trust disputes.277

(vi)

Omissions

Although the preceding subsections identify a few aspects of the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules
that seem specifically tailored to trust arbitration, there are a number of issues that the AAA has
not addressed at all. Indeed, the overall impression is that the AAA has largely tracked other
AAA rule sets without any regard to the unique nature of trust disputes. This, of course, is
highly problematic given the many unique challenges associated with mandatory arbitration of
internal trust disputes.
Proponents of the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules might claim that a number of these
procedural shortcomings could easily be cured by an arbitrator with adequate knowledge of trust
issues. However, there is no guarantee that arbitrators named to a AAA trust dispute will have
the kind of specialized skill in trust law that would allow them to exercise their discretion in a
particularly fruitful manner. For example, while the model clause proposed by the AAA
suggests that arbitrators should have a certain level of expertise in trust disputes, arbitration
under the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules may be invoked by means other than the model clause.278
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The only mention of arbitrator expertise in the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules themselves is a
statement indicating that the AAA will rely on its commercial roster for the appointment of
arbitrators.279
Parties to commercial trusts may not view the lack of trust-related expertise as
problematic, since participants in those kinds of disputes may value general commercial
experience more highly than qualifications relating to trusts per se. However, the trust form is
fundamentally different than other structural devices regardless of whether the trust is
commercial or personal, and the failure to require arbitrators to have significant experience in
both the procedural and substantive aspects of trust law puts the credibility of the entire process
into doubt. Given that concerns have been raised on numerous occasions about whether
arbitrators are capable of handling the kind of complex substantive and procedural matters
associated with trust disputes,280 the AAA should be trying to minimize worries about the quality
of trust arbitration, not exacerbate them.
At this point, settlors have no other dedicated rules of procedure that they can adopt in
preference to the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules. However, other arbitration rules may provide
some useful insights into how to handle certain relevant issues. First among these other rule sets
are the DIS Supplementary Rules.

(b)

The DIS Supplementary Rules

The DIS Supplementary Rules were developed in 2009 for use in shareholder arbitration
following a determination by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH)
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stating that shareholder disputes were arbitrable.281 The DIS Supplementary Rules, like the
AAA Trust Arbitration Rules, may be invoked by inclusion in the parties’ founding document
(i.e., the corporate charter or by-laws in the case of the DIS Supplementary Rules and the trust in
the case of the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules) or by subsequent agreement.282 Because the DIS
Supplementary Rules are only applicable to matters involving “limited liability companies
(GmbH) under German law” and “partnerships (Personegesellschaften),” they are inapplicable to
trust disputes per se.283
However, the fact that the DIS Supplementary Rules were not intended for use in trust
disputes does not mean that they cannot provide useful insights to those interested in designing
trust arbitration procedures, given that arbitration of internal shareholder disputes faces many of
the same practical and procedural challenges as arbitration of internal trust disputes. For
example, both kinds of proceedings can involve large numbers of parties.284 Furthermore, both
types of controversies reflect an in rem quality, in that the resolution of one party’s claims will
often be binding on both the legal entity (i.e., the trust or corporation) as well as individual
parties with notice, regardless of whether those other parties participated in the proceedings.285
These similarities suggest that innovations developed by the DIS for use in shareholder
arbitration might have some relevance to mandatory trust arbitration.
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The following discussion therefore introduces several novel procedures developed by the
DIS and considers them in the context of trust arbitration.286 In particular, the following
subsections discuss notice to and joinder of individuals who have an interest in the outcome of
the dispute but who do not actively participate in the arbitration; privacy and confidentiality;
substantive amendments to the statement of claim; procedures relating to parallel proceedings;
appointment of arbitrators; issues as to costs; and possible means of binding parties to the
dispute.

(i)
Notice to and joinder of individuals who have an interest in the
outcome of the dispute
DEFINITION OF “CONCERNED OTHERS”
The first issue to consider involves notice to and joinder of individuals who have an interest in
the outcome of the dispute. Both matters are central to trust disputes, since “effective trust or
estate arbitration must include a mechanism for providing notice and a fair opportunity to be
heard,” particularly “to minors and unborn and unascertained persons through their proper
representatives.”287 Indeed, “trustees must take all reasonable practiable [sic] steps” to provide
notice and accountings to actual and potential beneficiaries, even those who only have a
possibility of taking under a discretionary trust.288 Thus it has been said that:
[t]o avoid a challenge to an award and to enhance its enforcement in relation to all
parties concerned, it is important that all relevant persons be parties to the arbitral
proceedings. In England, the court – usually on the basis of a proposal of the
trustee – notifies the interested parties about an ongoing trust litigation and invites
Because the DIS Supplementary Rules are meant to be read in tandem with the DIS’s regular rules of
arbitration, there are a great many standard provisions that are left out of the DIS Supplementary Rules.
See DIS Supplementary Rules, supra note 19, rule 1; Arbitration Rules of the German Institution of
Arbitration, available at http://www.dis-arb.de/scho/schiedsordnung98-e.html [hereinafter DIS
Arbitration Rules].
287
ACTEC, supra note 10, at 20.
288
HAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, ¶56.11.
286

69

them to join the proceedings. It is recommended therefore that potential
beneficiaries should be notified of an arbitration – preferably prior to the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal – and that the parties should agree to the
intervention of such interested persons during the arbitral proceedings. It should
not be the duty of the arbitrators to include all interested parties but rather such
burden should be upon the claimant (possibly with a related duty of respondent to
inform claimant of any known potential beneficiaries).289
Collective shareholder disputes involve similar issues regarding the fairness of collective
notice and hearing mechanisms, which inspired the DIS to develop the concept of “Concerned
Others.”290 Notably, this innovation appears to be largely transferable to the trust context.
According to the DIS Supplementary Rules, a Concerned Other has the right but not the
obligation to participate in a particular proceeding. Although a Concerned Other in a collective
shareholder dispute will have a somewhat different relationship to the various parties than a
Concerned Other in a trust dispute will, in that the parties to a trust dispute could be situated
somewhat differently and could hold somewhat more diverse interests than the parties to a
shareholder dispute, both types of disputes could involve potential parties who may not be
actively involved in the controversy at the time the arbitration is filed but who should
nevertheless be given notice of a pending arbitration because they hold a legal interest that may
be affected by such proceedings. Furthermore, both types of disputes could involve potential
parties who have the right to join the dispute but who do not wish to do so, even after they have
received notice, either because they believe their interests are adequately represented by an
existing party or because they are indifferent as to the outcome of the dispute.
Concerned Others under the DIS Supplementary Rules are defined by their relationship to
the dispute. Thus:
[i]n disputes requiring a single decision binding all shareholders, . . . it is
mandatory not only to introduce the corporation as a party but all shareholders as
289
290
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Concerned Others to the arbitral proceeding. In case the introduction of any
Concerned Other is omitted, current jurisprudence does not recognize the
“arbitrability” of such disputes.291
Therefore, Concerned Others in the context of shareholder disputes can, in the first
instance, be considered to include all shareholders of the corporation as well as the corporation
itself. In a trust dispute, a Concerned Other might constitute not only the trust itself but also the
original and/or successor trustee(s), the original and/or successor protector(s), and former,
current or potential beneficiaries, to the extent that any arbitral award would attempt to affect
those persons’ rights in a final and binding manner. External third parties, such as creditors or
consultants, would likely not be bound by the arbitration provision in the trust and would
therefore not constitute a Concerned Other unless there existed a separate arbitration agreement
that contemplated the joinder of the third party dispute with a dispute under the trust.292
Although such overlapping agreements are not common, they can occasionally arise.293
The DIS recognizes two distinct subgroups within the category of Concerned Others. For
example:
[d]isputes requiring a single decision binding all shareholders and the
corporation and in which a party intends to extend the effects of an arbitral
award to all shareholders and the corporation without having been introduced
as a party to the arbitral proceeding (Concerned Others), the Concerned
Others shall be granted the opportunity to join the arbitral proceeding
pursuant to the [DIS Supplementary Rules] as a party or compulsory intervenor in
the sense of section 69 German Code of Civil Procedure (Intervenor). This
applies mutatis mutandis to disputes that require a single decision binding
specific shareholders or the corporation.294
291
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Therefore, a Concerned Other may act as either a party or an intervenor, with different rights and
responsibilities being associated with the two different classifications.
Collective shareholder arbitration is a relatively homogenous affair, with most
shareholders either sharing identical concerns or being classifiable into easily definable
groups.295 Trust disputes can involve a wider variety of parties with more diverse connections to
the trust and the issue in contention, although the number of variations is not unlimited.
Nevertheless, the distinction between a party and an intervenor may be useful in trust arbitration,
to the extent that such a distribution reflects the difference between an active participant and a
party who is only passively involved in the proceeding but whose rights will be affected by the
outcome. Interestingly, the concept of third party intervenors in trust-related arbitration has been
used on at least one occasion involving a Liechtenstein “stiftung” (foundation), which is
Liechtenstein’s version of a trust.296

PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH NAMING CONCERNED OTHERS
After defining the term “Concerned Others,” the DIS Supplementary Rules go on to describe the
practical procedures to be followed with regard to identifying and providing notice to those
persons. This is a several-step process that begins when the claimant files its statement of claim.
At that point, the claimant is required to “identify the respondent and any shareholders or the
corporation itself to which the effects of the arbitral award shall extend, by providing an address
of service and requesting the DIS-Secretariat to deliver the statement of claim also to the
295
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Concerned Others.”297 Respondents are also given the opportunity to identify additional
Concerned Others, as are any Concerned Others who subsequently join as parties.298 The
procedure for notification is the same in each case, with Concerned Others being given 30 days
from the time they receive the copy of the statement of claim to notify the DIS Secretariat in
writing whether they choose to join the proceedings “on claimant’s or respondent’s side as party
or as intervenor.”299
This type of notice procedure would also appear to work very well in the trust context. In
fact, this type of provision appears very similar to the kind of notice requirements described in
various probate codes regarding mandatory notice to presumptive heirs.300 It also complies with
suggestions made by experts in trust law that “potential beneficiaries should be notified of an
arbitration – preferably prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal – and that the parties
should agree to the intervention of such interested persons during the arbitral proceedings,” with
the burden of identifying potentially interested parties falling not upon the arbitrator but “upon
the claimant (possibly with a related duty of respondent to inform claimant of any known
potential beneficiaries).”301
Some difficulties could arise as a result of the need for Concerned Others to affiliate
themselves with either the claimant or the respondent, since that assumes that the substantive
issues in trust-related disputes can always be characterized as bilateral in nature. Of course, to
some extent, a bilateral administrative procedure may be necessary, at least as a presumptive
default option, since that is the norm in both litigation and arbitration. However, allowing
297
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Concerned Others to choose their affiliation for themselves is much better than mechanically
assigning parties to a particular group based solely on the time at which they enter the
proceedings, as appears to be the case under the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules.302 Notably, the
approach outlined in the DIS Supplementary Rules appears to have been adopted by at least one
U.S. court in the context of a trust arbitration.303
According to the DIS Supplementary Rules, failing to opt into the proceeding within the
prescribed time period acts as a waiver of a Concerned Other’s right to join the arbitration
actively as either a party or an intervenor.304 Nevertheless, Concerned Others can join the
proceeding even after the notice period has expired, although consequences do arise as a result of
the delay. For example, those who wish to join the proceedings after the expiry of the initial
time period may only do so “provided that they refrain from raising objections against the
composition of the arbitral tribunal and either accept the arbitral proceeding as it stands at the
point in time of their joinder, or the arbitral tribunal approves their joinder at its free
discretion.”305 Notably, this provision regarding late joinder applies not only to Concerned
Others who were named during the initial notification period but also to Concerned Others who
were not identified until after that period has ended.306
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Interestingly, the approach adopted in the DIS Supplementary Rules somewhat resembles
certain provisions adopted in a model arbitration clause designed by the ICC for use in trusts.307
The relevant portions of that model clause state that:
[i]f, at any time, any person requests to participate in arbitral proceedings already
pending under the present arbitration clause, or if a party to arbitral proceedings
pending under this arbitration clause desires to cause any person to participate in
the arbitration, the requesting party shall present a request for joinder to the Court
setting forth the reasons for the request. It is hereby agreed that if the Court is
prima facie satisfied that a basis for joinder may exist, any decision as to joinder
shall be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal itself. When taking a decision on the
joinder, the Arbitral Tribunal shall take into account all relevant circumstances,
including, but not limited to, the provisions of the trust and the stage of the
proceedings. It is further agreed that the Court may reject the request for joinder
if it is not so satisfied, in which case there shall be no joinder. In case of a joinder
after the signature or approval of the Terms of Reference, an amendment to the
same will be made either through signature by the parties and the Arbitral
Tribunal or through approval by the Court, pursuant to Article 18 of the ICC
Rules of Arbitration. It is agreed that in such a case, the Court may take whatever
measures that it deems appropriate with respect to the advance on costs for
arbitration.308
While both the ICC and the DIS attempt to balance issues relating to any possible
prejudice to either the joining or existing parties, the DIS approach seems slightly better, in that
it gives the parties the absolute right to join the arbitration so long as they do not attempt to
attack retroactively any of the procedural decisions already made. Given the importance of
having all the parties to a trust dispute present, that appears better than leaving the final decision
in the hands of the arbitral tribunal.
The DIS Supplementary Rules also distinguish between the rights and responsibilities of
Concerned Others who have joined as parties and the rights and responsibilities of Concerned
307
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Others who have joined as intervenors. For example, Concerned Others who have joined the
proceeding as parties “become a party to the arbitral proceeding with all rights and duties
pertaining thereto at the moment their declaration of joinder is received by the DISSecretariat.”309 Alternatively, those who join as intervenors “are entitled to the rights of a
compulsory intervenor in the sense of section 69 German Code of Civil Procedure.”310 One of
the ways in which the two groups differ is that only those who join as parties are permitted to
name additional Concerned Others.311 This obviously increases the legitimacy of the joinder
process, since those who are official parties to the dispute (as opposed to intervenors) will suffer
most if there is any malfeasance in the naming process and thus have a heightened incentive to
identify all relevant parties but no others.
One issue that could arise in the context of trust disputes but not shareholder disputes
involves the possibility that some Concerned Others may not be inclined to name additional
parties if the Concerned Others think that in so doing they will decrease the benefits they will
receive under the trust.312 However, failure to provide notice to the appropriate parties will open
the arbitral award up to challenge, since parties who have not received notice will not be bound
by the award. Therefore, it is in the best interest of all parties to ensure that the notification
process is full and fair.313
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Another potential difficulty involves the logistics of notice. The DIS Supplementary
Rules make some provision for this, indicating in the introductory notes that:
it is recommended to adopt elsewhere in the articles of incorporation a provision
pursuant to which all shareholders are obliged to provide the corporation with a
current address of service or a representative for service and that receipt of any
written communication at this address will be assumed after the expiry of an
adequate time period.314
Settlors may not be able to impose a similar obligation on the beneficiaries of a trust,
particularly since some beneficiaries may be unborn or unascertained at the time the trust is
created. However, trustees and protectors (both past and present) could certainly be required to
provide a current address for service of process.

(ii)

Privacy and confidentiality

Although privacy and confidentiality have long been considered hallmarks of arbitration,315 the
DIS Supplementary Rules explicitly permit limited derogations from both. Notably, the AAA
Trust Arbitration Rules may also allow some deviation from the strict application of privacy,
although the relevant language is somewhat ambiguous.316
Under the DIS Supplementary Rules, confidentiality is diminished to the extent that the
arbitral tribunal is required to inform Concerned Others who have been identified but who have
not yet joined the arbitration “on the progress of the arbitral proceeding by delivering copies of
written pleadings of the parties or intervenors as well as decisions and procedural orders by the
arbitral tribunal to the Concerned Others at their indicated addresses, unless Concerned Others
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have expressly waived in writing to receive this information.”317 This approach is necessary
because the DIS Supplementary Rules are essentially an opt-in procedure, which results in a
heightened need to keep Concerned Others who have not yet joined the arbitration individually
apprised of the proceedings so that any non-participants have the opportunity to exercise their
right to join the arbitration before the award is finalized.318 The DIS Supplementary Rules
indicate that the same procedure “applies for other communications of the arbitral tribunal to the
parties or intervenors,” though “only in so far as it can be reasonably assumed that these are
significant for the decision of a Concerned Other on its later joinder to the arbitral
proceeding.”319
This procedure would likely be as useful in trust arbitration as it is in shareholder
arbitration. Both types of disputes may involve parties who are technically interested in the
outcome of the arbitration but who may not wish to participate actively. However, because
potentially interested parties in these special types of multiparty arbitration cannot keep
themselves apprised of the status of the case in the same way that they do in litigation,320 it
therefore appears appropriate to impose a limited duty of notification on either on the trustee or
the arbitral tribunal.321 In many ways, this poses few, if any, problems as a matter of principle,
since notifications are only going to those who have been identified as having an actual or
potential interest in the outcome of the dispute and no more information is being provided than
would be available in a litigation.
317
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Confidentiality is not the only principle that is affected under the DIS Supplementary
Rules. Privacy is also diminished, with the rules stating that “Concerned Others, that have not
joined the arbitral proceeding, are not entitled to participate in the oral hearing.”322 Although the
language is formulated in the negative, the result is that any Concerned Others who have joined
the arbitral proceeding may participate in the oral hearing, thus expanding the number of persons
who may be present at the hearing beyond the individuals who filed the arbitration or were
initially named as respondents.
Opening the doors of the hearing to Concerned Others who have joined the proceedings
makes good sense in trust arbitration as well, since those persons are bound by the outcome of
the arbitration to the same extent as parties who were named initially. The exclusion of
Concerned Others who have not yet joined the dispute is not problematic as a matter of principle,
since the DIS Supplementary Rules require that notice be given of any matter that might be
significant to a Concerned Other’s decision to join the proceedings.323 While this may not mirror
judicial procedures perfectly, in that non-parties can freely attend any hearings in court while
they are only given notice of a particular in-person proceeding in a trust arbitration, the DIS’s
approach allows any Concerned Other who is truly interested in the outcome of that oral hearing
to join the arbitration and attend the proceeding.

(iii)

Substantive amendments to the statement of claim

One of the most pressing problems in large-scale dispute resolution involves the question of who
has the ability to make decisions for the group regarding litigation strategy. This is a problem
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not only in shareholder arbitration but also in any type of internal trust dispute that requires a
coordinated response from a large group of beneficiaries.324
The DIS Supplementary Rules address this issue by making “[a]n extension of claim or a
change of the subject-matter (including any possible counterclaims) . . . only admissible with
consent of all Concerned Others.”325 However, “[t]he complete or partial withdrawal of claim is
admissible without consent of the Concerned Others, unless a Concerned Other objects within 30
days after being informed on [sic] the intended withdrawal of claim and the arbitral tribunal
acknowledges his legitimate interest in a final decision of the dispute.”326
In these provisions, the DIS is attempting to balance the rights and interests of the various
parties and appears to be doing so appropriately. However, the DIS’s approach is somewhat
different than that reflected in the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules, which state that no new or
different claim can be submitted by a party without the consent of the arbitrator.327 Although the
distinction is slight, one worry under the DIS Supplementary Rules might be that the arbitration
could be effectively held hostage by one party who refuses to consent to an amendment to an
existing claim. This is somewhat problematic given that the failure to provide consent in a large,
multiparty procedure may not even be intentional but could instead simply be due to an oversight
on the part of a person who did not understand the ramifications of his or her actions.
Nevertheless, the DIS obviously took the view that party autonomy should prevail over
procedural efficiency, at least in matters as important as the formulation of claims and
324
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counterclaims. Whether and to what extent the DIS approach should be adopted in trust
arbitration is open to debate, since there are good arguments to be made either way.

(iv)

Procedures relating to parallel proceedings

Issues relating to the substantive amendment of claims demonstrate some of the difficulties
associated with strategic decision-making in the multiparty context. Another area of concern
involves the coordination of related claims brought by different individuals and the possibility of
parallel proceedings. Again, this is an issue that can easily arise in trust disputes, given the
number of parties and the potential disparity of their relationships to each other and the trust
itself.
The DIS Supplementary Rules take a uniquely forward-looking view of this particular
issue by specifically addressing the possibility that “multiple arbitral proceedings with a subjectmatter have been initiated, requiring a single decision binding the parties and the Concerned
Others.”328 In such cases, “[t]he arbitral proceeding that has been initiated first (leading arbitral
proceeding) precludes the conduct of an arbitral proceeding initiated at a later point in time
(subsequent arbitral proceeding). A subsequent arbitral proceeding is inadmissible.”329
Given the ease with which a Concerned Other can join an existing arbitration under the
DIS Supplementary Rules, this appears to be a reasonable solution and would work equally well
in trust disputes.330 While some difficulties might arise with respect to the ability of late-joined
Concerned Others to affect the litigation strategy and bring claims or counterclaims, the DIS
Supplementary Rules notably limit the first-to-file rule to actions that involves a single subject-
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matter and require a single decision to bind all parties.331 This suggests that actions involving
significantly different claims would not be subject to this rule.
Furthermore, by restricting the application of this provision to subsequent arbitral
proceedings, the DIS Supplementary Rules leave open the possibility of an appropriate parallel
proceeding in court. This is particularly important in trust disputes, which might involve
concurrent jurisdictional competency either as a result of a statute giving the courts exclusive
jurisdiction over certain matters332 or a split jurisdiction provision found in the trust itself.333

(v)

Appointment of arbitrators

Another potential pitfall for any kind of multiparty arbitration involves the appointment of
arbitrators. Many of the traditional difficulties in this regard334 have been avoided in the DIS
Supplementary Rules through provisions allowing the DIS Appointing Committee to nominate a
sole arbitrator if the parties cannot agree on a neutral within the requisite time.335 In cases
involving three arbitrators, the DIS Supplementary Rules allow the claimant group and the
respondent group to select their own party-appointed arbitrators.336 If one side cannot agree on
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an arbitrator within the requisite time, the DIS Appointing Committee appoints two arbitrators,
an approach that is also used in the general DIS Arbitration Rules.337

(vi)

Issues as to costs

Another area of concern in multiparty disputes involves the allocation of costs and fees,
particularly when loser-pays rules apply.338 This can become particular problematic when some
members of the presumed collective have decided not to join a legal action while another
subgroup of the collective has.
Cost-sharing issues are taken into account in the DIS Supplementary Rules through an
explicit reference to Section 35 of the general DIS Arbitration Rules, which states that:
[i]n principle, the unsuccessful party shall bear the costs of the arbitral
proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the case, and in particular where each party is partly successful
and partly unsuccessful, order each party to bear his own costs or apportion the
costs between the parties.339
While no guidance exists as to how costs will be split, the DIS Supplementary Rules do
indicate that “Concerned Others that have not joined the arbitral proceeding as a party or
intervenor are not entitled to reimbursement of costs.”340 Furthermore, the DIS Supplementary
Rules indicate that the costs amount is to be calculated pursuant to point number 11 of the

See id., §8(3). The dual appointment reflects the recalcitrant team’s appointment and the chair, who
otherwise would have been named by the two party-appointed neutrals. See id., §13. These procedures
are similar to those adopted by the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules, in that the AAA will also appoint the
arbitrator(s) if parties cannot come to an agreement. See AAA Trust Arbitration Rules, supra note 17,
rule 11.
338
See Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, in 622 THE ANNALS OF
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 7, 22-25 (Deborah Hensler et al. eds.,
2009) [hereinafter The Annals]; Christopher Hodges, What Are People Trying to Do in Resolving Mass
Issues, How Is It Going, and Where Are We Headed? in The Annals, supra, at 330, 343.
339
DIS Arbitration Rules, supra note 286, §35.2; see also id. §12.1.
340
DIS Supplementary Rules, supra note 19, §12.1; see also DIS Arbitration Rules, supra note 286, §35.
337
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Appendix to Section 40.5 of the DIS Arbitration Rules, with any identified Concerned Others
being treated as a party.341
The DIS’s approach is not the only possible means of allocating costs among parties to a
collective dispute. For example, some commentators have suggested that it might be appropriate
to provide a smaller costs award in collective disputes that involve some sort of public interest.342
Application of this principle might be appropriate in trust arbitration, not only with respect to
charitable trusts (which by definition involve some sort of public benefit),343 but also perhaps
with respect to some types of commercial trusts (such as pension or investment trusts) that
arguably involve a public benefit or service.344
While arbitral tribunals may always make appropriate orders as to costs, having
the standards or procedures set forth in the governing rule set improves the process by
making it more transparent and less discretionary. Currently, the AAA Trust Arbitration
Rules permit some reduction in fees in cases of hardship, which provides a useful means
of avoiding inequitable treatment of the parties but which does not increase
predictability.345 This is particularly problematic given the amount of money that it takes
to pursue some types of collective disputes346 and the need for parties to know in advance

341

See DIS Supplementary Rules, supra note 19, §12.2; see also DIS Arbitration Rules, supra note 286,
§40.5, Appendix to 40.5, point number 11 (indicating that “[i]f more than two parties are involved in the
arbitral proceedings [counting any identified Concerned Others as parties], the amounts of the arbitrators’
fees pursuant to this schedule are increased by 20% for each additional party,” but also noting that the
arbitrators’ fees are to be increased by “no more than 50% in total”).
342
See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign-Attorney Fee Paradigms from Class
Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 124, 147 (2003) (limiting the applicability of loser-pay rules in
“public interest” type cases, which might include cases involving collective redress); Strong, DeAmericanization, supra note 152, at 519.
343
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 436-39.
344
See supra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
345
AAA Trust Arbitration Rules, supra note 17, rule 41.
346
See In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 634 F.3d 187, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2011).
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whether and to what extent they will be responsible for their opponents’ fees and costs in
case of an adverse judgment or award.

(vii)

Binding parties to the dispute

The final issue to consider involves potential problems associated with binding certain parties to
an arbitration. For example, one issue that can arise in the context of shareholder disputes is the
possibility that former shareholders might raise objections to the continuing applicability of any
arbitration agreement. This issue has been resolved by the DIS through language in its model
arbitration clause explicitly stating that former shareholders remain bound by the agreement.347
A similar type of issue might arise in trust disputes regarding former beneficiaries, trustees or
protectors, suggesting that trust arbitration would benefit from the adoption of an approach
similar to that used by the DIS.
Second, the DIS recognized that disputes can arise as to whether an award resulting from
an arbitration should be given res judicata effect with respect to persons who do not actively
participate in the arbitration.348 This concern is handled in the DIS Supplementary Rules through
language in both the model clause and the Rules themselves stating that:
[t]he effects of an arbitral award extend also to those shareholders, that have been
identified as Concerned Others within the time limits provided, irrespective
whether they have made use of their opportunity to join the arbitral proceedings
as a party or as an intervenor. . . . The shareholders named as Concerned Others
within the time limits provided, commit to recognize the effects of an arbitral
award rendered in accordance with the [DIS Supplementary Rules].349

See DIS Supplementary Rules, supra note 19, Model Clause (stating “[f]ormer shareholders remain
bound by this arbitration agreement”).
348
This issue can be particularly problematic in states where the right to assert a legal claim is considered
to be individual in nature. See Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 163, at 507, 536.
349
DIS Supplementary Rules, supra note 19, Model Clause. The language in Section 11 varies slightly.
See id., §11. In some ways, this provision negates the claim that the DIS Supplementary Rules constitute
an opt-in procedure, since Concerned Others have no way to avoid being bound by the outcome of the
347
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This language is useful in that it helps provide finality by eliminating any possible
objections based on the non-participation of a particular party. While it may be more difficult to
bind all actual and potential parties to a trust dispute through language of this nature, particularly
given issues relating to the representation of unborn, unascertained and legally incompetent
beneficiaries, those involved in drafting arbitral procedures may wish to consider whether similar
language regarding the res judicata effect of an award arising out of a trust arbitration would be
at all useful.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Interest in mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes is on the rise, with settlors and trustees
in a variety of jurisdictions eager to find a way to minimize spiraling litigation costs and avoid
some of the procedural concerns associated with cross-border judicial procedures.350 While
arbitration seems in many ways to be the natural solution, mandatory arbitration of internal trust
disputes faces a number of unique challenges not found in other areas of law.
One of the most pressing questions relates to the actual procedure to be used in the
arbitration. Interestingly, it appears that settlors can increase – or, possibly, decrease – the
enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision found in a trust by adopting particular
procedures. This puts significant pressure on settlors to choose appropriate procedures so as to
ensure a favorable determination on the enforceability of an arbitration provision.
Although there are a number of ways for settlors to dictate arbitral procedures to be use
din future trust disputes, the easiest and best way is to adopt an arbitral rule set specifically
award, even if they do not actively participate in the proceedings. However, the nature of these sorts of
shareholder disputes requires an in rem approach, just as trust disputes do.
350
Arbitration of internal trust disputes carries a number of benefits beyond cost savings. See Strong,
Two Bodies Collide, supra note 9.
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designed for use in trust disputes. However, the only set of institutional rules that even purports
to address the special needs of trust arbitration – the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules – appears to
be entirely inadequate to the task. Rather than offering a highly specialized set of rules tailored
specifically to the unique demands of trust arbitration, the AAA appears to be operating largely
under the belief that trusts are just another type of business association351 and that standard
arbitral procedures are sufficient to address any disputes arising under a trust. Therefore, settlors
must look elsewhere for assistance.
Happily, the DIS has provided a number of extremely innovative ideas in the DIS
Supplementary Rules. While the DIS has restricted use of these rules to certain types of
shareholder disputes, settlors can nevertheless use the rules as inspiration when setting up
individual, ad hoc arbitrations.
Of course, widespread reliance on ad hoc procedures is not the best way for the trust
industry to proceed on a long term basis. Instead, the trust bar and the arbitral community need
to come together to develop a new set of arbitral rules that truly takes the unique challenges of
trust arbitration into account. While the drafters of those rules can and indeed should look to the
DIS Supplementary Rules for inspiration, particularly with respect to the identification of and
notice to actual and potential parties, there are a number of other issues that need to be
addressed. These include (1) matters regarding late-joining and non-participating parties, (2)
special or virtual representation, including appointment and payment of the representative, (3)
arbitral (as opposed to judicial) approval of consent awards and (4) the possibility of multiple

351

There is little evidence that the AAA considered concerns relating to commercial trusts separately
from those arising under non-commercial trusts. While very little attention has been paid to this issue
generally, one would expect an arbitral institution that was drafting a specialized rule set to have
considered such matters at length.
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awards regarding judicial accounting or instruction procedures, including the extent to which an
arbitrator could consider facts raised and decisions made in earlier arbitral proceedings.
It is also important that any rules relating to trust arbitration reinforce certain principles
of arbitration law that may not be well-known among the trust bench and bar, since that will help
eliminate any residual prejudices that may remain in the trust industry regarding arbitration.352
Therefore, any new arbitral rules targeted toward trust disputes should explicitly demonstrate (1)
the fairness of the appointment mechanism, (2) the independence and impartiality of the
arbitrators and (3) the extent to which arbitrators must apply the law.
Current trends suggest that an increasing number of jurisdictions are going to rule
favorably on mandatory trust arbitration in the coming months and years.353 As such, the
number of trusts with mandatory arbitration provisions is bound to increase. Since many of these
trusts will be international in nature, it is incumbent on the international arbitral community to do
its part to ensure that the law in this field develops in accordance with established principles of
arbitration law and practice. While this Article has only addressed one of a number of concerns,
it is hoped that this discussion will act as an inspiration for further developments, initiatives and
research involving mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.

See ACTEC, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing the “blinding prejudice” to arbitration in contemporary
trust and estates practice).
353
See Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 8.
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